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The Search for Excess Returns  
and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties  
 
Ian Ayres* and Edward Fox** 
Modern finance theory and investment practice have shifted toward 
“passive investing.” The current consensus is that most savers should invest in 
mutual funds or ETFs that are (i) well-diversified, (ii) low-cost, and (iii) expose 
their portfolios to age-appropriate stock market risk. The law governing trustees, 
investment advisers, broker–dealers, 401(k) plan managers, and other 
investment fiduciaries has evolved to push them gently toward this consensus. 
But these laws still provide broad scope for fiduciaries to recommend that clients 
invest instead in specific assets that they believe will produce “alpha” by 
outperforming the market. Seeking alpha comes at a cost, however, in giving up 
some of the benefits of the well-diversified, low-cost, appropriate-risk baseline. 
Too little attention has been given in fiduciary law to this tradeoff and, thus, to 
when seeking alpha is prudent and beneficial for savers, and when it is not. 
This Article begins to fill that gap by making two contributions. First, we 
provide the first benchmark estimates of how much alpha is required before 
ordinary investors would be better off departing from the consensus. For 
example, we estimate that a person of average risk aversion would annually need 
to beat the market by (i.e., obtain alpha of) between 6% and 15% before being 
willing to entirely forego the benefits of diversification and hold an individual 
stock (and that during a financial crisis such a person would need an annual 
alpha between 9% and 18%). Second, we consider the implications of our results 
for the various branches of law governing investment fiduciaries. We propose 
generally that fiduciaries should prudently weigh these alpha tradeoffs, and then 
should explain them to their clients before recommending (or executing) 
investments that deviate from the low-cost, well-diversified, age-appropriate 
exposure standard. We argue that through new technology, this kind of 
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information can be given to retirement savers and others at quite low cost. Our 
results also have a variety of more specific applications. For example, our work 
shows that the value of diversification increases during periods of market 
upheaval, and therefore the duty of trustees to diversify personal trusts and 
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I.  Introduction 
Investment fiduciaries—like trustees, investment advisers, brokers, and 
401(k) plan managers—help direct trillions of dollars of savings, including 
most of the nonhousing wealth of ordinary savers.1 Because these fiduciaries 
play a variety of roles in the investment process, no single body of law applies 
to all of them. Nevertheless, the fiduciary duties imposed by these different 
branches of law are aimed at a common problem: ensuring that savers’ funds 
are invested prudently, with a level of risk appropriate for each investor’s 
circumstances and earning the highest expected return given that level of risk. 
The question of how to invest prudently is often viewed by retail investors as 
daunting, but today’s consensus is actually easily described: absent some 
opportunity to beat the market, one should invest in vehicles (such as mutual 
funds or ETFs) that are (1) well-diversified, (2) low-cost, and (3) expose 
one’s portfolio to age-appropriate stock market risk.2 This consensus arose 
from decades of empirical and theoretical finance research. The laws 
governing investment fiduciaries have evolved to reflect this consensus and 
to push fiduciaries towards recommending (or executing) strategies 
consistent with it. There remains ample scope, however, for fiduciaries to 
recommend investing instead in specific assets that promise to deliver above-
market returns. This is known in the argot of finance as “seeking alpha.”3 
Alpha investment opportunities often involve a tradeoff: investors gain 
expected excess returns but are required to sacrifice some of the benefits of 
diversification, low fees, or appropriate risk. 
The laws governing fiduciaries have paid too little attention to 
identifying when seeking alpha is prudent, i.e., when the expected excess 
returns outweigh the costs of departing from the low-cost, diversified, 
appropriate-risk baseline. Indeed, we are not aware of any systematic 
attempts to provide estimates of how much alpha is needed to justify under-
diversification costs or taking on the wrong level of market risk. Yet, these 
 
1. As of 2014, approximately $4.4 trillion was held in 401(k) accounts alone. EMP. BENEFITS 
SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND 
GRAPHS 1975–2015, 31 tbl.E23 (2018). About 77% of the nonhousing savings (and 63% of total 
savings) of persons in the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution is held in some type of retirement 
account, the vast majority in accounts to which the fiduciary law contained in the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) applies. See Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel 
Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. 
ECON. 553, 579 fig.2 & app. II tbl.E2 (2018) (depicting the average pretax income of the bottom 
90% and what types of assets compose the wealth of this group). 
2. In fact, one of us has described it while standing on one leg. Ian Ayres, Concise Advice for 
Investing, While Standing on One Leg, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/whynot/2016/01/30/hillel-investment-advice/#60501a4b6b55 [https://perma.cc/9YCJ-GRSN]. It 
might be accomplished by simply investing your assets in a Vanguard target-date fund with the date 
you plan to retire. 
3. The term “alpha” derives from the generic term for the intercept in the linear Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) equation. See infra text accompanying note 29. 
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estimates are necessary before one can rationally distinguish beneficial alpha 
seeking from the imprudent chasing of excess returns. Our first contribution 
in this Article is to provide a methodology for evaluating these costs and then 
to empirically estimate them.4 
Our estimates of the required offsetting alpha are often substantial. For 
example, we calculate that an investor with average risk aversion would need 
to expect an annual alpha between 6% and 15% before being willing to 
entirely forego the benefits of diversification by holding only an individual 
stock. Moreover, during a period of market upheaval she would need to 
expect an alpha between 9% and 18%. Alpha of this magnitude would easily 
more than double the risk premium normally paid on stock.5 
Of course, most alpha opportunities are not so extreme as to necessitate 
investing solely in an individual stock. But some diversification is always 
sacrificed when investors adopt an alpha-seeking strategy. This is because 
the choice to concentrate one’s investments in an alpha opportunity implies 
some movement away from the portfolio that would have best diversified 
risk. This results in the investor bearing some risk that is specific to the alpha 
investments—called “idiosyncratic risk”—which could otherwise have been 
diversified away. Even more modest departures from full diversification can, 
as we later show, impose substantial losses in alpha-seeking portfolios as 
large as 50 stocks. 
In this Article, we identify two other benefits that alpha investors 
sometimes sacrifice in their attempts to achieve above-market returns. 
Besides sacrificing the benefits of diversification, investors also at times take 
on too much or too little exposure to stock market risk when pursuing alpha 
investment opportunities. While the diversification tradeoff involves bearing 
a nonoptimal amount of idiosyncratic risk in return for alpha, the exposure 
tradeoff involves taking on nonoptimal amounts of stock market risk, often 
called “systemic risk,” to get alpha. Some alpha strategies involve both of 
these tradeoffs. For example, an investor who believes that her company will 
strongly outperform the market and chooses to invest all her savings in it 
might be exposed to nonoptimal amounts of both systemic and idiosyncratic 
risk. Finally, investors may be willing to pay large fees to fund managers 
whom they expect will deliver returns that more than offset the fee expense. 
Common sense tells us that a manager charging a large, supracompetitive fee 
must obtain alpha of at least the size of the excess fee to make it worth 
investing with her. But intuition provides no clear guideline for what 
 
4. Our estimates depend in part on the assumptions we use, including, in some analyses, the 
CAPM. Qualitatively, we expect our results to continue under other reasonable assumptions about 
asset pricing and investors’ preferences, but the precise size of the requisite offsetting alpha may 
change under other models or preferences. See infra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
5. The “risk premium” on stock is typically measured by comparing the historical average 
performance of equity compared to that of (practically) risk-free Treasury bonds. This premium has 
averaged about 4% in the United States. See infra text accompanying Table 3. 
AYRES.LINK&SUBHEAD.FIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  11:26 PM 
450 Texas Law Review [Vol. 97:445 
 
minimum alpha is required to justify sacrificing diversification or optimal 
market exposure. Our results suggest the offsetting alpha is frequently 
substantial in real-world settings. 
Having empirically estimated the minimum compensating alphas 
needed to justify these diversification, market risk, and excess-fee tradeoffs, 
we explain how fiduciary duties should take into account these alpha 
tradeoffs. Our results have both general implications, which apply across a 
variety of contexts, and more specific applications for trustees, investment 
advisers, brokers, and 401(k) administrators, among others. 
Our goal in this Article is to make retail alpha investing “safe, legal, and 
rare[r].”6 We do not propose that fiduciaries eschew all alpha opportunities, 
by insisting, for example, that all retail portfolios be invested in low-cost, 
passively managed index funds.7 Rational investors, guided or unguided by 
fiduciaries, may sometimes identify credible alpha opportunities. We make 
no claim that such opportunities are fleetingly small. As a theoretical matter, 
there can be both Type I alpha errors (mistakenly pursuing alpha that will not 
pan out) and Type II alpha errors (mistakenly failing to pursue alpha that 
would deliver superior returns). And while some of our regulatory proposals 
might reduce Type II errors (for example, by enabling currently chilled trust 
fiduciaries to more easily trade off diversification for alpha), the bulk of our 
efforts here are to reduce existing Type I errors. Few retail investors, even 
when guided by investment fiduciaries, have sufficient information to justify 
the costs of seeking alpha. Indeed, the very magnitude of our estimates of 
required excess returns provides good reason for thinking that too many 
fiduciaries currently “seek alpha” on behalf of their clients. 
Accordingly, we argue that fiduciaries who recommend or invest in 
alpha portfolios should be required to explicitly consider the costs of doing 
so. Specifically, fiduciaries should (1) estimate the costs of excessive fees, 
failing to diversify, and deviating from what otherwise would be optimal 
exposure, (2) separately estimate and justify the expected alpha from the 
investment decision, and (3) show that the expected alpha exceeds these 
costs. Fiduciaries who are recommending alpha-seeking portfolios should 
have a duty to explain the pertinent tradeoffs to their clients. Moreover, 
fiduciaries should have dynamic mechanisms in place to update their 
 
6. Versions of the quoted phrase have been used by, among others, Bill Clinton. President Bill 
Clinton, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago (Aug. 29, 1996) (“[A]bortion should not only be safe and legal, it should be rare.”). The 
suggestion that government should reduce the prevalence of abortion is contested, in part, because 
it threatens to impinge on a fundamental right to privacy. The idea that, in order to protect investors, 
the law should discourage fiduciaries from recommending (or executing) strategies that cut against 
a consensus among economists and financial professionals is far less controversial. 
7. Cf. Peter Orszag & Cass R. Sunstein, Give People Choices, Not Edicts, MINN. LAWYER  
(Dec. 6, 2013), https://minnlawyer.com/2013/12/06/peter-orszag-cass-r-sunstein-give-people-
choices-not-edicts/ [https://perma.cc/GM62-GEWH] (arguing that default rules like automatic 
enrollment in savings plans can provide benefits while still providing freedom of choice). 
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recommendations based on evolving market conditions and to keep track of 
their success (across clients) in predicting alpha. 
Beyond this general duty to explicitly consider and explain alpha 
tradeoffs, our results have a number of specific implications for various 
financial fiduciaries. For example, our estimates show that the value of 
diversification increases during periods of market upheaval. We therefore 
argue that the duty of trustees (of both personal trusts and defined benefit 
ERISA plans) to diversify should be stricter during these periods. Likewise, 
we argue that when idiosyncratic risk is high, trustees and the courts must be 
more sensitive to whether trusts waiving the duty of diversification—often 
these are trusts holding a family business—must nevertheless be diversified 
to protect the beneficiaries. 
Trustees are subject to a strict duty of loyalty to consider only the best 
interests of the trust’s beneficiaries. If trustees make bad decisions to seek 
alpha, therefore, those mistakes will usually arise from genuine errors 
concerning the costs and benefits of trying to get alpha. By contrast, there is 
widespread concern that due to conflicts of interest, brokers may recommend 
that retail clients imprudently seek alpha by buying  high-fee mutual funds.  
These funds in turn pay the broker substantial commissions. Both the 
Department of Labor (the “Fiduciary Rule”) and the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“Regulation Best Interest”) have proposed or promulgated 
major regulations on this issue in the last couple of years. Because the 
Fiduciary Rule has been vacated, the SEC’s proposed rule is the most likely 
candidate to significantly alter the status quo. To determine whether a 
broker’s advice was unacceptably biased, the SEC’s proposed new rule 
would look at both (1) the broker’s conflict of interest and (2) how prudent 
the advice was. Our alpha analysis can help the agency refine that second 
question to more accurately decide when brokers are putting their own 
interests ahead of their clients’. In addition, to help assure that fiduciaries can 
perform a reasonable alpha cost–benefit assessment, we also recommend that 
Financial Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA) licensing tests for broker–
dealers and registered investment advisers be enhanced to require would-be 
licensees to understand the three tradeoffs at the heart of our analysis. 
We also suggest that ERISA be revamped to reduce the chance that 
savers in self-directed retirement accounts make ill-advised alpha 
investments. Specifically, we propose that the Department of Labor should 
issue new regulations interpreting § 404(c). These regulations would require 
that, in order to qualify for safe-harbor immunity, 401(k) plan sponsors 
periodically provide investors with an individualized portfolio analysis of 
potential diversification, exposure, and fee mistakes. This disclosure should 
include warnings about the alpha that would be required to justify the 
participant’s portfolio choices and an estimate of how frequently retail 
investors with similar portfolios have achieved alphas of that size. 
Our concerns about brokers and 401(k) plan managers reflect a desire to 
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help prevent retail investors from mistakenly seeking alpha. Research 
suggests this is where the most serious alpha mistakes are made.8 Thus the 
gains from improving fiduciary conduct are likely to be greatest in these 
areas. Nevertheless, our results—e.g., the increasing importance of 
diversification during periods of upheaval—have important implications 
even for financially sophisticated parties because they are not yet widely 
appreciated. Moreover, our general proposal that fiduciaries should be 
required to weigh the costs and benefits of seeking alpha makes sense even 
when both the fiduciary and the beneficiary are sophisticated for the same 
reason that fiduciaries are held to an enforceable duty to act prudently along 
other dimensions in such contexts. 
The costs of implementing these alpha duties is significantly lower 
today than it would have been in the past. With the advent of fintech like 
“robo-advisors,” fiduciaries can usually make reasonable estimates of the 
alpha tradeoffs at quite low costs. In addition, while we are cognizant that 
our proposed duties could add to litigation expenses, we believe the existence 
of an effective safe-harbor when fiduciaries recommend a passive strategy 
limits this concern. Likewise, following existing trust law, any litigation 
arising out of these duties should be focused on the process used by the 
fiduciary rather than a substantive second guessing of the fiduciary’s 
conclusion, to avoid incentivizing investors who lost money after receiving 
ex ante prudent advice to sue nevertheless. 
Finally, we also consider the potential ramifications of our proposals for 
the broader economy rather than just investor protection. Our proposals aim 
in large part to reduce Type I errors: mistaken bets on alpha which will not 
pan out for the investor. Eliminating these bets will shift funds away from 
investment managers who try to find alpha by locating underpriced assets to 
passive funds which do not engage in price discovery. This in turn suggests 
that reducing Type I alpha errors may make asset prices less accurate. We 
conclude, however, that this effect is likely to be modest and self-limiting. 
The price discovery that would be lost is likely to be the most marginal 
(which is why it does not earn enough alpha to pay its costs). Moreover, if 
securities prices become less accurate that will make it easier to find alpha, 
drawing funds back into price discovery. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into three Parts. Part II explains 
theoretically why alpha expectations might justify what otherwise would 
seem to be mistaken failures to diversify, minimize fees, or maintain age-
appropriate exposure to equities. Part III presents our empirical estimates of 
the alpha required under a variety of conditions, levels of risk aversion, and 
different degrees of departure from optimal diversification, exposure to 
market risk, and competitive fees. Finally, Part IV draws out the normative 
implications of our analysis for three different sets of investment fiduciaries: 
 
8.  See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 15 and 144. 
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trustees who might pursue alpha opportunities when investing trust assets, 
broker–dealers and investment advisers who might recommend or execute 
alpha opportunities for their clients, and ERISA fiduciaries who might offer 
alpha opportunities in 401(k) plan menus. 
II. Distinguishing Between Mistakes and Tradeoffs 
A.  The Three Central Investment Mistakes 
Retail investors often struggle to decide how best to invest non-
precautionary savings.9 Nevertheless, the consensus among economists and 
financial professionals is surprisingly straightforward: Absent an alpha 
opportunity, one should hold a portfolio which is (1) well-diversified, 
(2) low-cost, and (3) exposes you to age-appropriate stock market risk. The 
flip-side of this guidance is that there are three central investment mistakes: 
failing to diversify, paying high (supracompetitive) fees, and failing to 
expose one’s portfolio to an appropriate amount of market risk. 
Failing to diversify can be an investing mistake because diversification 
can reduce risk at very low cost. This means that diversification allows 
investors to reduce the volatility of returns without reducing expected returns. 
As a theoretical matter, full diversification would require portfolios holding 
some of every risky asset—including, for example, international equities, real 
estate investments, and all manner of fixed income securities.10 In practice, 
substantial benefits from diversification can be achieved by holding as few 
as ten well-selected large-cap stocks.11 While a portfolio of this size is far 
less risky than a single-stock portfolio, there remain very important benefits 
to further diversification, particularly during periods of high volatility. 
We estimate that diversification during normal times can reduce the 
standard measure of volatility, the standard deviation of the annual return, by 
14.3%—from 33.5% on an average individual U.S. equity to 19.2% on a fully 
diversified portfolio of U.S. stocks.12 What’s more, the benefits of 
 
9. Scholars often distinguish between precautionary and retirement savings. See, e.g., Anders 
Anderson et al., Precautionary Savings, Retirement Planning and Misperceptions of Financial 
Literacy 15–18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21356, 2015) (treating 
precautionary and retirement savings as distinct categories for financial-literacy analysis). 
10. See generally HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT 
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (6th ed. 1968) COWLES FOUNDATION MONOGRAPH #16 (1959) 
(developing his earlier work on mean-variance analysis and portfolio theory). 
11. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 24–26 (2d 
ed. 1998) (citing studies suggesting a portfolio of 10 stocks may provide as much as 88% of total 
potential diversification advantages). 
12. These figures are drawn from a “Monte Carlo simulation,” which uses historical stock data 
to build a distribution of returns for both a diversified portfolio and the “average” individual stock. 
We split the sample into “normal” periods and “crisis” periods, by looking at the volatility of the 
market over the prior 30 days. If the annualized market volatility over the past 30 days was over 
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diversification tend to be greater during periods of economic upheaval. In 
Figure 1, we plot the standard deviation of a diversified portfolio of CRSP 
stocks and the average volatility of individual stocks over time. During times 
of crisis, diversification reduces the standard deviation of return by 16.6%—
from 51.4% on an average individual stock to 34.8% on a diversified 
portfolio of U.S. stocks. Failures to diversify risk are generally not as stark 
as investing all of your savings in company stock, but lower-bound estimates 
on partial failures to diversify 401(k) savings have been estimated to be 
equivalent to paying excess fees of 0.71% annually.13 
Paying excessive fees can be an investment mistake because these fees 
eat away at the net return. For example, paying an excess fee of 2% over time 
can halve your retirement savings.14 Overcharges on this order of magnitude 
have routinely occurred in the real world. One of us, in analyzing more than 
3,500 401(k) plans (with more than $120 billion in assets), found that the top 
5% had excess fees of 2.05% (with average excess fees of 0.63%).15 
 
 
25%, then we classified the month as a crisis period. For more information, see infra notes 
accompanying Table 1. 
13. See Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Measuring Fiduciary and Investor Losses in 401(k) Plans 
43 tbl.2 (7th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Working Paper, 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107796 [https://perma.cc/PE5A-8QHV] 
(mean menu diversification costs of 0.06% + mean investor diversification losses of 0.65% = 
0.71%); see also Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of 
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1499–1500 (2015) 
[hereinafter Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification]. 
14. Ten-thousand dollars invested at a 6% annual return over 40 years will come to equal 
$102,857, but a 4% return will yield only $48,010. See Chris Arnold, When High Fees Stink Up 
Your 401(k), What Can You Do?, NPR (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/30/453163154 
/when-high-fees-stink-up-your-401-k-what-you-can-do [https://perma.cc/67TN-NLX8] (stating 
that a 2% annual fee “eats up half of your earnings over 35 years”). 
15. See Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 13, at 1499–1500 tbl.1 (sum of 
“Plan additional fees” + “Plan Menu Additional Fund Fees” + “Investor Choice Additional Fund 
Fees”). Sixty-three basis points of excess fees would reduce the 40-year nest-egg by more than 20% 
(from $102,857 to $81,036). See Arnold, supra note 14 (discussing the long-term impact of excess 
fees on 401(k) investment plans). 
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Exposing one’s portfolio to the wrong amount of market risk is a 
mistake because investors who take on too much or too little stock market 
risk fail to optimally trade off risk and return. We will henceforth call this a 
“beta” mistake because in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), beta is 
a numeric measure of how exposed a portfolio is to market risk. A portfolio 
with a beta of 0 is invested in risk-free assets, while a portfolio with a beta of 
1 is invested 100% in equities. Investors can make beta mistakes by exposing 
their portfolio to either too much or too little stock market risk given their 































Risk of Holding a Single US Stock vs. a 
Diversified Portfolio
Market Risk (Diversified…
Average Risk of Single US Stock
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Point A in Figure 2 depicts the expected return and risk (standard 
deviation of expected return) of a portfolio that optimally balances risk and 
return for a particular investor. In this Figure, the straight line is the “Capital 
Allocation Line,” which represents the set of the best achievable investment 
portfolios. (These are the best portfolios because in a simple CAPM model 
like this, one cannot beat the market.16) Each point on the Capital Allocation 
Line (CAL) is uniquely associated with a particular beta—that is, the 
percentage of the portfolio exposed to market risk. At the far left (the y-axis), 
the portfolio is composed exclusively of risk-free assets, which earn the risk-
free rate, Rf. Because it has no market exposure, this portfolio thus has a beta 
of 0. The beta increases as one moves along the CAL to the northeast (say, 
from Point B to C). The curved lines represent this investor’s “iso-utilities,” 
the set of returns and risks for which the investor’s utility is constant. Higher 
iso-utility curves lie northwest because investors prefer higher expected 
returns and lower risk. Point A is optimal because at that point the benefits to 
the investor of decreasing risk by moving down the CAL are exactly offset 
by the value she places on the associated decrease in expected return (and 
vice versa moving up the CAL). Points B and C depict exposure mistakes 
with portfolios that place the investor on a lower iso-utility curve. Point B 
represents a portfolio that includes too few risky investments, given the 
 
16. Under the standard CAPM model, there is a single fully diversified portfolio of risky 
assets—the market portfolio—which all investors will own. Investors, however, will vary what 
proportion of their wealth they hold in the market and the Capital Allocation Line represents the 
return and risk of different combinations of risk-free assets and the market portfolio. 
 The model does not account for frictions like transactions costs, taxes, the inability of investors 
to borrow at the risk-free rate, or the lack of full information available to all investors, and it assumes 
homogenous investor expectations. 
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investor’s risk preferences, while Point C represents a portfolio that includes 
too much risky investment. 
Robert Merton in 1969 offered a simple equation to estimate the optimal 
portfolio exposure as a function of just three variables17: 
𝛽𝑀 =  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝜎2 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
where βM is the measure of optimal exposure to market risk, the Risk Premium 
is the amount by which the return on risky assets (say, a diversified portfolio 
of stocks) is expected to exceed the risk-free return (on say, government 
bonds), σ2 is the expected volatility of returns (captured, say, by the variance 
of expected stock returns), and Risk Aversion is the investor’s “relative risk 
aversion,” which measures how sensitive she is to risk, with 0 indicating she 
is risk neutral and with larger numbers indicating an increasing unwillingness 
to bear additional risk to get a fixed increase in her expected returns.18 Like 
many economic models, Merton’s assumes that investors exhibit “constant 
relative risk aversion” (CRRA), which much empirical work, though not all, 
suggests is a reasonable approximation of real behavior.19 We also adopt the 
assumption of CRRA in our empirical work below.20 Studies estimate that 
the relative risk aversion of average investors is in the range of 2 to 4.21 For 
 
17. See Robert C. Merton, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty: The Continuous-
Time Case, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 247, 253 (1969) (rewriting the “optimal proportion in the risky 
asset . . . in terms of Pratt’s relative risk-aversion measure . . .”); Paul A. Samuelson, Lifetime 
Portfolio Selection by Dynamic Stochastic Programming, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 239, 244–45 
(1969) (applying Merton’s “continuous-time case” analysis to the author’s own model). 
18. Returning to Figure 2, the investor’s relative risk aversion is technically a measure of the 
curvature of her iso-utility curve. 
19. See, e.g., Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, Do Wealth Fluctuations Generate 
Time-Varying Risk Aversion? Micro-Evidence on Individuals’ Asset Allocation, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
713, 733 (2008) (finding that CRRA predicts investor behavior fairly well and better than other 
popular models); Pierre-André Chiappori & Monica Paiella, Relative Risk Aversion Is Constant: 
Evidence from Panel Data, 9 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1021, 1024 (2011) (finding that CRRA describes 
investor behavior relatively well). 
20. CRRA is often used in conjunction with CAPM even though, under some assumptions, for 
CAPM to exactly predict prices in the model, investors must have quadratic utility. Our use of 
CAPM should therefore be thought of as a simple way to approximate how returns are generated. 
See P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Felix Kubler, Approximate CAPM When Preferences Are CRRA, 29 
COMPUTATIONAL ECON. 13, 14 (2007) (“[E]mpirical contradictions of CAPM might be explained 
by the fact that some agents do not have quadratic utility. . . . On the other hand[,] . . . the CAPM 
pricing formula provides a very good prediction for actual equilibrium returns.”). 
21. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Diversification Across Time, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., 
Winter 2013, at 73, 74–75, 82 (applying a risk-aversion parameter of 4); Robert B. Barsky et al., 
Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health 
and Retirement Study, 112 Q.J. ECON. 537, 548, 563 (1997) (finding mean “risk tolerance”—which 
is the inverse of relative risk aversion—in a representative survey is .24, which corresponds to an 
average CRRA parameter of about 4); Néstor Gandelman & Rubén Hernández-Murillo, Risk 
Aversion at the Country Level 2 (Research Div., Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 
No. 2014-005B, 2014), http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2014/2014-005.pdf 
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example, if the risk premium is 4%, the standard deviation is 20%, and risk 
aversion is 2, then the optimal beta will be 50%.22 
Merton’s investment exposure equation makes intuitive sense: an 
investor should, all else equal, be willing to hold a portfolio that is more 
exposed to market risk when the expected premium of holding risky assets is 
larger, and be less willing to hold a portfolio that is more exposed to market 
risk when the expected volatility of risky assets is higher or if the investor is 
more averse to that risk. 
Merton’s exposure equation, however, excludes the age of the investor. 
If investors tend to become more risk averse as they age, then it would be 
natural that they would reduce their equity exposure as they grew closer to 
retirement. Target-date mutual funds tend to follow a variety of age-
contingent strategies, such as the following “birthday rule”: 
𝛽𝐵 ≈ 110 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒 
A target-date fund following the birthday rule would invest 
approximately 90% of its assets in equities when the investor is 20 and 
approximately 50% of its assets in equities when the investor is 60.23  
To assess whether an investor is making a beta mistake, we must know 
what the right exposure to stock market risk would be. Reasonable people 
can differ over some range of exposures. However, some exposures are prima 
facie unreasonable judged by any of these standards.24 For example, one 
 
[https://perma.cc/TJ8E-H3WP] (finding that most common estimates of average relative risk 
aversion are between 1 and 3). 
22. (.04)/(.2*.2*2) = .5. 
23. While there is not a well-known term to capture the possibility of exposure or beta mistakes, 
the possibility is indirectly captured by ERISA regulations regarding default investment options 
when a 401(k) participant fails to provide investment instructions. One of the ways an investment 
product can qualify as a “Qualified Default Investment Alternative” (QDIA) in which those 401(k) 
funds can be invested is to have “a mix of investments that takes into account the individual’s age 
or retirement date” such as a target date retirement fund. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: REGULATION RELATING TO QUALIFIED DEFAULT INVESTMENT 
ALTERNATIVES IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS 2 (2008). Sadly, while 
the QDIA requirements attend to beta and diversification mistakes, they are inattentive with regard 
to excessive-fee mistakes. Ian Ayres, 401(k) Reforms: What Should Be Done, FORBES (May 27, 
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/whynot/2014/05/27/401k-reforms-what-should-be-
done/#3888ff3a223d [https://perma.cc/4D77-9Q6W] (“But the regulations don’t stop plans from 
adopting default funds with excessive fees.”). 
24. Indeed, one of us argued for a third “leveraged lifecycle” approach: 
𝛽𝐿𝐿 = max [2,
𝛽𝑀 ∗ 𝑃𝑉(𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
] 
where PV(Lifetime Savings) is the risk-adjusted expected future and present savings and Present 
Savings is the amount that the investor has currently saved. See IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, 
LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE, AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF 
YOUR RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO 74–76 (2010) (arguing that investors “should start out fully 
leveraged” and stay that way until their “present savings are sufficient to meet [their] risk-adjusted 
target”). This leveraged-lifecycle equation that the authors offer does a better job of diversifying 
risk across time and reduces an investor’s exposure to that of the Merton equation as the investor 
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study found that in 2007, roughly half of 401(k) participants in their 20s had 
no exposure to equity.25 These investors are likely making exposure mistakes 
(akin to Point B in Figure 2) by not capturing any of the substantial risk 
premium on equity. Such low beta portfolios fail both the Merton and 
birthday rule beta standards.26 Of course, with sufficiently high risk aversion 
or pessimistic market expectations, a low beta might be justified. But young 
people putting all their savings in money market accounts is a horrible way 
to save for retirement. The same study found that more than a fifth of older 
401(k) participants (ages 56–65) had more than 90% of their portfolio in 
equities.27 This is likely an example of the second type of exposure mistake 
(akin to Point C in Figure 2), as these participants are arguably exposing too 
many of their assets to stock market risk. However, it is admittedly harder to 
empirically identify this second form of beta error. Oldsters who invest 
almost entirely in equities are inconsistent with the lifecycle dicta but not 
necessarily inconsistent with Merton’s exposure equation, if, for example, 
the participants are not particularly risk averse and hold more sanguine views 
about the stock market.28 
B. Three Alpha Investing Tradeoffs 
While the last section explained how failing to diversify, economize on 
fees, or give one’s portfolio appropriate exposure to equities can be mistakes, 
this section explains how each of these deviations might instead be justified 
by sufficient expectations that particular investment opportunities will 
deliver risk-adjusted returns superior to investing in the market as a whole. 
We will call such opportunities “alpha” investments following popular 
finance parlance. The term derives from how one might measure whether an 
investment generates excess returns: regressing the returns of that investment 
on the returns of a diversified portfolio of risky assets, which we will 
henceforth simply call the “market portfolio.” 
The regression (in simplified form29) is: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) where 
 
approaches retirement (because PV(Lifetime Savings) will equal current savings when there are no 
future saving increments). 
25. Jack VanDerhei, What Will Happen to Retirement Income for 401(k) Participants After the 
Market Decline?, 22 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 129, 134–35 (2010). 
26. They are even more inconsistent with the Leverage Lifecycle standard proposed by Ian 
Ayres and Barry Nalebuff. See AYRES & NALEBUFF, supra note 24 (emphasizing that investors 
should increase equity exposure early in the investment lifecycle). 
27. VanDerhei, supra note 25, at 135. 
28. In addition, investors who have saved far more than they will personally consume during 
their lives might rationally invest more aggressively because they wish to pass along as much as 
possible to their heirs. 
29. In fact, both the returns on the investment and the market should be measured net of the 
risk-free rate, and there must be an error term that adjusts for the fact that the returns of any 
investment are not perfectly predicted by the market in every period. Thus, the full regression is 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of the investment in question in period t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  is the return 
on the market portfolio in period t. If the investment outperforms the market, 
the regression will yield a positive intercept, αi, hence the term “alpha.” Note 
that by controlling for the investment’s correlation with market returns, 𝛽𝑖, 
the regression adjusts for the investment’s exposure to market risk. Thus, 
alpha will not automatically be generated by investments with high market 
exposure and high expected returns. 






In Figure 2, we assumed away a number of real-world complexities, 
which meant that alpha opportunities were impossible. Recall that in that 
world, the CAL represents the set of the best achievable portfolios, which 
consists of (0 alpha) portfolios mixing risk-free assets and the market 
portfolio (Point M). If we now consider a world in which alpha opportunities 
can exist, alpha investments will lie above the CAL, like Points A and B in 
Figure 3.30 Since Point A is to the left of Point M, it represents an investment 
with a β < 1. In contrast, Point B represents an alpha investment (again lying 
above the CAL) but with more heightened exposure to systemic risk with a 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑅𝑓  is the risk-free rate and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the mean-0 error 
term. 
30. Alpha investments might also be based on a privately held belief that the systemic (beta) 
risk of a particular stock is lower than the market (and beta regressions) suggest. An alpha investor 
would in this case want to tilt toward larger portfolio holdings of the stock not because it lies 
“above” the CAL given its beta, but because it lives to the “left” of the CAL. But this alternative 
characterization would continue to produce the same type of increased exposure to idiosyncratic 
risk indicated by the movement from Point A to A′. 
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β > 1. Because the risk-adjusted expected returns of these two investments 
exceed the expected market return, one would rationally want to hold them 
as part of a diversified portfolio. Indeed, the excess returns could even cause 
one to be willing to overweight them in a portfolio—investing more than 
would be necessary to diversify. 
Overweighting an alpha opportunity will come at a cost, however. The 
investor will bear some of the risk specific to the alpha investment—its 
“idiosyncratic risk”—which would have been diversified away if she did not 
overweight it. To make this more concrete, imagine that the alpha investment 
opportunity is “lumpy”: the investor must invest all her savings in A or buy 
none at all.31 Say A is a startup with a minimum investment equal to the 
investor’s savings. The additional idiosyncratic risk of investing only in A is 
shown in Figure 3 as Point A′, which lies horizontally to the right of A. Given 
its level of systemic risk, A is a positive alpha opportunity lying above the 
CAL, but once we account for the loss of diversification, such a lumpy alpha 
opportunity need not make the investor better off. Indeed, as shown in 
Figure 3, Point A′ lies below the CAL. 
More generally, the additional expected return from investing in a 
lumpy alpha opportunity might or might not exceed the detrimental loss of 
diversification. For example, Figure 4 shows three possible outcomes of 




Point B′ is, like Point A′, an alpha opportunity that lies below the CAL 
once we account for idiosyncratic risk. Point B′′ is an alpha opportunity that 
lies above the CAL once we account for idiosyncratic risk, but it still lies 
 
31. We focus on lumpy investments in this subpart in part to build intuition. We consider the 
theoretical and empirical implications with non-lumpy investments at the end of this Part and in the 
next empirical Part. 
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below the utility the investor could achieve by investing in a fully diversified 
portfolio at Point D. And Point B′′′ is an alpha opportunity that lies above 
both the CAL and the investor’s utility from holding a diversified portfolio. 
Only in the last case (Point B′′′) would the investor be better off foregoing 
the benefits of diversification and placing all her savings in the alpha 
opportunity. Accordingly, it is not true that investors should always remain 
diversified. But the foregoing shows that sacrificing diversification requires 
a sufficient offsetting alpha. 
A similar argument also applies to an investor trading off alpha for 
moving away from her ideal beta (exposure to market risk). A lumpy alpha 
opportunity might force an investor to be exposed to more or less market risk 
than she would have chosen from the zero-alpha alternatives on the CAL. As 
discussed above, this deviation in exposure would reduce the investor’s 
expected utility. But, as before, expecting a sufficient alpha can outweigh the 
costs of departing from the ideal level of exposure. For example, in Figure 5, 





Now imagine that the investor is offered an alpha investment that 
exposes her to less systemic risk than at Point D, which means she will also 
obtain less of the risk premium. This positive alpha investment might either 
be utility-enhancing or not. In Figure 5, Point A′ shows an alpha opportunity 
that lies above the CAL but not above the investor’s iso-utility curve. 
Point A′′, in contrast, shows an alpha opportunity that lies above both the 
CAL and the investor’s iso-utility curve. Only in the latter case would the 
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alpha benefit outweigh the cost of having a beta that is too low given the 
investor’s risk preferences.32 
Finally, the opportunity to obtain alpha might justify paying what 
otherwise would seem to be excessive fees. For example, imagine an investor 
is contemplating whether to invest in a well-diversified, actively managed 
mutual fund that charged f basis points in fees more than competitive passive 
indexes, but which is expected to generate excess returns of α basis points. 
Here, the fee/alpha tradeoff is relatively straightforward. The key question is 
whether the excess expected returns justify the excess management fees: 
α > f 
One should invest in the alpha opportunity only if expected alpha is 
greater than the excess fee. Graphically, this condition requires that the 
expected return of the opportunity net of the excess fee lies above the CAL. 
As with the other examples examined above, our excess-fee 
hypothetical again isolates a single tradeoff—here the fee/alpha tradeoff. By 
assumption, the actively managed fund is well-diversified and non-lumpy so 
that the investor need not take on idiosyncratic risk and can adjust her equity 
exposure by mixing the fund to different degrees with government bonds. 
Real-world investments at times do only require considering the tradeoffs on 
one of these three dimensions. A mutual fund focused on one industry might 
sacrifice diversification without sacrificing fees or exposure. Or a high-fee 
target date fund (such as Fidelity Freedom Funds with expense ratios as high 
as 70 basis points annually33) might sacrifice competitive fees without 
diversification or exposure. Or a twenty-year-old’s 100% money market 
portfolio investment might sacrifice exposure without sacrificing 
diversification or competitive fees.34 In each of these examples, an investor 
would need to have a sufficient alpha expectation to justify the isolated 
sacrifice of diversification, competitive fees, or optimal equity exposure. 
But in many other contexts, the alpha investment opportunity will entail 
sacrificing some combination of diversification, competitive fees, or optimal 
market exposure. Actively managed funds, for example, usually both have 
higher fees and require some diversification sacrifices because the fund 
managers must pick a limited number of firms that they believe will 
 
32. The analysis above implicitly assumes the investor is at least somewhat liquidity 
constrained. To the extent she can borrow at the risk-free rate to buy more risky assets, she can 
invest in the lumpy alpha opportunity without lowering the beta of her assets as a whole. 
Realistically, however, investors cannot borrow at the risk-free rate and do face other liquidity 
constraints. 
33. Fidelity Freedom 2030 Fund, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-
funds/summary/31617R704 [https://perma.cc/B45P-U2KF?type=image]. 
34. Investing one’s entire portfolio in money market or government bonds might be considered 
an alpha opportunity—allowing one to beat the market—if one expected equity prices to fall. 
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outperform the market. Lumpy, all-or-nothing investment opportunities are 
particularly prone to simultaneously requiring the sacrifice of both 
diversification and optimal equity exposure. Starting a family business, for 
example, might expose an investor to both idiosyncratic risk and too much 
(or too little) systemic risk.35 The key question in such situations would be 
whether the alpha expectation is sufficient to justify the total risk (systemic 
and idiosyncratic combined) that the investor has to take on. As shown 
graphically, this means not only that the expected return lies above the CAL 
when considering total risk, but the expected return lies above the iso-utility 
curve for the next-best market alternative. 
Our theoretical analysis has focused on the CAPM and lumpy alpha 
opportunities, but it can easily be generalized. For example, Eugene Fama 
and Kenneth French have identified two attributes (or “factors”) that 
empirically have been associated with excess returns, namely firms with 
small market capitalizations and those with a high-ratio book value to market 
value.36 From a CAPM perspective, the excess returns that tend to be 
garnered by small-cap stock or high book value stock can be interpreted as 
an “alpha,” which would lead rational investors to want to overweight small-
cap stocks in their portfolios. But as depicted in Figure 3, this overweighting 
will cause at least some diversification loss, pushing up the portfolio risk, 
possibly inside the CAL (as in Point B′). Rational investors would not want, 
however, to overweight in ways that reduce utility below the iso-utility line.37  
How much to overweight becomes a central concern when the alpha 
opportunity is not a lumpy, all-or-nothing investment choice, but can be 
chosen by an investor in various increments. An actively managed mutual 
fund with high management fees is a quintessential example of a non-lumpy 
investment because the investor can vary the proportion of her portfolio that 
she chooses to invest in the high-fee fund. An opportunity to start a family 
business, in contrast, is a much more lumpy investment as it might require 
committing a substantial proportion of an investor’s portfolio. Minimum 
 
35. Note that an investor would prefer a lumpy investment to have a lower beta than if she was 
investing in a diversified portfolio. Intuitively, this is because the addition of the lumpy investment’s 
idiosyncratic risk makes the investor more sensitive to risk in the tradeoff between systemic risk 
and expected return. It is akin to the investor having become more risk averse, and this means she 
will prefer a lower beta when confronting an investment with idiosyncratic risk. 
36. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks 
and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8 (1993); see generally, Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, An 
Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Price Theory, 35 J. FIN. 1073 (1980) (laying out a 
theoretical multifactor model). 
37. It would also be reasonable to think of offsetting alphas as being properly measured after 
controlling for the Fama–French factors or using another multifactor model. This is often how 
finance researchers measure mutual fund alphas. See infra note 44. In Figure 6, we estimate the 
offsetting alpha necessary to induce an average investor to bear de-diversification costs after 
controlling for the Fama–French factors. The results are barely different than using only the CAPM. 
 
AYRES.LINK&SUBHEAD.FIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  11:26 PM 
2019] Alpha Duties 465 
 
investment requirements imposed by various types of funds (including hedge 
and private equity funds) also can make investment options a lumpy or 
discrete portion of a portfolio. 
Theory tells us that when a non-lumpy alpha opportunity arises, rational 
investors would want to “tilt” or overweight their portfolios toward the 
investment.38 The extent of tilt will depend on the particular costs and 
benefits (and will be empirically estimated in the next section). When the 
alpha opportunity is lumpy, the optimal all-or-nothing investment choice will 
be “nothing” if the alpha is not sufficient to justify the incremental 
diversification, exposure, and fee losses. 
III. Empiricism 
The last Part explained as a theoretical matter why investment 
opportunities with expectations of sufficient above-market returns could 
justify reduced diversification, high fees, or non-optimal exposure to market 
risk. In this Part, we turn from theory to numbers—to estimate how much 
alpha is required to justify a failure to diversify, economize on fees, or obtain 
age-appropriate exposure to market risk. The estimates (and the ability to 
make such estimates) are important because, as we will argue in Part IV, 
fiduciaries who make one of the presumptive mistakes without considering 
whether they have the requisite alpha or who do not have a sufficient basis 
for believing that an investment opportunity has a sufficient alpha might, in 
a variety of contexts, be held liable. 
The analyses below should be thought of as benchmarks, not the 
definitive estimates of the requisite alpha, because our results are dependent 
in part on our assumptions, including about the investor’s other sources of 
income, the investor’s preferences, and, in some analyses, the use of CAPM. 
An analysis by an actual fiduciary would need to be tailored to the investor’s 
life circumstances including her sources of income other than investments, 
age, risk preferences, etc. In addition, as noted above, we make the common 
assumption that the investor’s preferences can be represented by constant 
relative risk aversion. Financial economists, however, have suggested several 
other models of risk aversion, which help explain swings in asset prices 
during recessions and booms. These models typically posit larger increases 
in risk aversion (or something akin to that) during recessions than those 
implied by constant relative risk aversion.39 Using these models would 
 
38. Intuitively, at the optimal beta, the investor is essentially indifferent between taking on 
marginally more risk and getting marginally more return by moving up the CAL. Purchasing a tiny 
amount of the alpha opportunity, however, provides a better tradeoff between risk and return than 
moving along the CAL, and hence, all investors will want to purchase at least a tiny amount of the 
alpha opportunity if possible. 
39. See John H. Cochrane, Macro-Finance, 21 REV. FIN. 945, 948 (2017) (listing various 
prominent macro-finance theories). 
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further increase the estimated alpha required to forego diversification during 
recessions and periods of market upheaval.40 
With respect to trading off alpha for taking on non-optimal amounts of 
market exposure, we invoke CAPM’s results to understand how increasing 
market exposure changes expected returns and overall risk.41 Although 
CAPM remains widely used, there is a broad literature arguing that it is 
incomplete and contending that multifactor models should be used instead.42  
A.  Excess Fees 
The required alpha to justify a mutual fund’s excess fees is the easiest 
to estimate. As mentioned in the last Part, the required alpha is simply the 
amount by which the fees exceed the competitive expense ratio charged by 
other funds offering well-diversified portfolios of similar investment classes. 
It would be a “nirvana fallacy” mistake to assume that the competitive market 
can offer diversified portfolios at zero cost. For domestic equities, there are 
a host of diversified funds and ETFs that annually charge less than 25 basis 
points. While for emerging markets, the competitive expense ratios are 
somewhat more, but many are offered with fees of less than 50 basis points.43 
It is only the excess above the competitive price that needs to be traded off 
against alpha. When considering combination-fee tradeoffs, one can begin by 
simply subtracting the excess fees from the expected alpha and then asking 
whether the alpha net of excess fees is sufficient to justify the shortfall in 
diversification or exposure. Thus, in considering the required alphas 
 
40. Our model also does not allow for the possibility that some investors might get some 
satisfaction from the act of seeking alpha itself. If such investors get pleasure out of trying to figure 
out which firms will outperform the market, they might rationally prefer to invest in alpha-seeking 
strategies even if those strategies would not otherwise be justified by the expected gains in portfolio 
wealth. Likewise, our model does not cover individuals who “view the stock market as a substitute 
for gambling” and who are, in economics terms, “risk loving.” See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, 
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003) (noting the phenomenon of 
investors who prefer a remote chance to “strik[e] it rich”). 
41. The diversification results do not invoke CAPM. They simply ask how much we need to 
increase the expected return of a stock on average to make an investor with a given level of risk 
aversion indifferent to holding a single stock instead of a broad equity market index. This estimate 
should still be valid even if there are other sources of systemic risk other than stock market risk, as 
posited in multifactor models. See Fama & French, supra note 36, at 6–10 (employing a multifactor 
model); Roll & Ross, supra note 34, at 1074, 1076–78 (same). This argument is buttressed by 
Figure 6, which shows that explicitly controlling for the Fama–French factors makes little difference 
in the diversification analysis. 
42. See Fama & French, supra note 36, at 5 (arguing that multiple factors are necessary to 
explain expected returns); Roll & Ross, supra note 36, at 1073–74 (noting potential flaws in 
CAPM’s predictions and proposing an alternative approach).. 
43. For a list of funds with expense ratios listed, see Diversified Emerging Mkts, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, https://money.usnews.com/funds/etfs/rankings/diversified-emerging-mkts 
[https://perma.cc/76DR-X5X5]. 
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estimated below, they should be construed as the net alphas that are required 
to take on deviations from optimal diversification or exposure. 
Various studies have reported negative average mutual fund alphas 
(ranging between –0.45% and –0.60% per year).44 Nonetheless, some 
scholarship suggests that winning bets on actively managed higher-fee 
mutual funds do exist for a small percentage (less than 3%) of funds.45 
However, studies suggest that such alpha over-performance is not 
 
44. Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers find that the average “unconditional estimated alphas for each 
category are negative, ranging from –0.45% to –0.60% per annum.” Laurent Barras et al., False 
Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas, 65 J. FIN. 179, 195 
(2010); see also Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 64 
tbl.3 (1997) (finding negative average alphas for mutual funds in a four-factor model); Edwin J. 
Elton et al., Efficiency with Costly Information: A Reinterpretation of Evidence from Managed 
Portfolios, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 11 (1993) (finding negative average alphas using two- or  
three-factor models); Michael C. Jensen, Problems in Selection of Security Portfolios: The 
Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–1964, 23 J. FIN. 389, 400 tbl.2 (1968) (finding 
negative average alphas for mutual funds in the 1940s–1960s); see generally Bruce N. Lehmann & 
David M. Modest, Mutual Fund Performance Evaluation: A Comparison of Benchmarks and 
Benchmark Comparisons, 42 J. FIN. 233 (1987) (measuring alphas for 130 mutual funds over a 
fourteen-year period). Javier Gil-Bazo and Pablo Ruiz-Verdú also show that among actively 
managed equity funds, funds that are high-cost have worse “before-fee risk-adjusted” performance, 
meaning that high costs generally do not ensure better returns. Javier Gil‐Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, 
The Relation Between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153, 2154 
(2009). 
45. For instance, Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers find that 75.4% of the entire cross-section of 
mutual funds generate alphas equal to zero. Barras et al., supra note 41, at 196, 197 tbl.2. From the 
24.6% remaining funds, 24.0% produce negative alphas and .6% yield truly positive alphas. Id. at 
197 tbl.2. Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White deploy a bootstrap strategy to detect that 
that the large positive alphas of the top 10% of funds, net of costs, are extremely unlikely to be 
solely due to luck and not managerial skill. Robert Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” 
Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2580, 2593–94 
(2006). Meanwhile, Baks, Metrick, and Wachter identify the gains from investing in actively 
managed funds by using a Bayesian method of performance evaluation that accounts for investors’ 
prior beliefs about alphas that are consistent with intuition about managerial skill. Klaas P. Baks et 
al., Should Investors Avoid All Actively Managed Mutual Funds? A Study in Bayesian Performance 
Evaluation, 56 J. FIN. 45, 46–47 (2001). Other studies have estimated positive alphas using past 
returns, manager characteristics like age and education, and past fund inflows. See Mark M. Carhart, 
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 67 (1997) (associating portfolio 
characteristics like size and turnover with performance); Robert S. Carlson, Aggregate Performance 
of Mutual Funds, 1948–1967, 5 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 20 (1970) (finding a positive 
relationship between portfolio performance and the availability of new funds); Judith Chevalier & 
Glenn Ellison, Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? Cross-Sectional Patterns in 
Behavior and Performance, 54 J. FIN. 875, 876 (1999); Edwin J. Elton et al., The Persistence of 
Risk-Adjusted Mutual Fund Performance, 69 J. BUS. 133, 134 (1996); Joseph H. Golec, The Effects 
of Mutual Fund Managers’ Characteristics on Their Portfolio Performance, Risk and Fees, 5 FIN. 
SERV. REV. 133, 136 (1996); Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, The Persistence of Mutual Fund 
Performance, 47 J. FIN. 1977, 1983 (1992); Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in 
Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 51 J. FIN. 783, 793 (1996); Darryll Hendricks et al., Hot Hands in 
Mutual Funds: Short-Run Persistence of Relative Performance, 1974–1988, 48 J. FIN. 93, 102 
(1993); Lehmann & Modest, supra note 41, at 260; Lu Zheng, Is Money Smart? A Study of Mutual 
Fund Investors’ Fund Selection Ability, 54 J. FIN. 901, 912 (1999). 
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persistent.46 For example, a recent study found that of the top half of funds in 
2010, only 4.47% were able to stay in the top half for five years, and only 
0.28% stayed in the top quarter.47 
B.  Diversification Costs 
Estimating the required alpha to justify sacrificing diversification is the 
central empirical motivation for this Article. Imagine that you had a lumpy 
choice of either investing all your savings in a single stock representative of 
public U.S. companies (say, your company’s) or in a fully diversified mutual 
fund of U.S. equities. How big would the expected alpha on the single stock 
have to be to justify the obvious loss in reduced idiosyncratic risk that could 
be achieved through diversification?48 
To answer this question, we examined historical data on U.S. stocks 
from the mid-1920s through 2015. We calculated the utility of investors with 
various levels of risk aversion from holding either a diversified portfolio or a 
single stock over the course of one year. We then estimated how much alpha 
the individual stock must generate before an investor would prefer the 
individual stock with its higher alpha-boosted returns but higher risk to the 
diversified portfolio. We made separate calculations for periods of market 
upheaval because idiosyncratic risk rises during economic crises,49 meaning 
that the required alpha will usually rise as well. We defined these 
 
46. See Carhart, supra note 41, at 74 (attributing persistent positive performance in managed 
portfolios to statistical noise rather than managerial skill); Barras et al., supra note 44, at 182 
(finding that new, over-performing funds which attract high inflows of new investments are 
relatively likely to be estimated to have produced positive alpha (18% of funds), but over the next 
five years only 2.4% of those funds are estimated to have produced positive alpha). 
47. AYE M. SOE, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, DOES PAST PERFORMANCE MATTER? THE 
PERSISTENCE SCORECARD 3 exhibit 2 (2014), http://www.spindices.com/documents/spiva 
/persistence-scorecard-june-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/G85A-XVEK]. A recent paper provides a 
more comprehensive review of this extensive literature. See generally Jason P. Berkowitz et al., 
Characteristics of Mutual Funds with Extreme Performance, REV. FIN. ECON., Sept. 2017, at 50. It 
is plausible that high-fee funds are more likely to earn sufficient alpha to offset their costs to 
investors in less informationally efficient markets than U.S. equities, like real estate, U.S. bonds, or 
equities in developing countries, etc. But see Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Christopher R. 
Blake, Fundamental Economic Variables, Expected Returns, and Bond Fund Performance, 50 J. 
FIN. 1229, 1251 (1995) (finding average negative alphas in bond mutual funds). 
48. This comparison is close to an analogous choice between investing costlessly in a single 
representative stock or investing in a fully diversified mutual fund with excess fees. And the 
analogous question is: How high would the excess fees have to be before you would prefer investing 
in the single stock? This question arises in real-world settings as some 401(k) plans offer company 
stock with no (or minimal) transaction or annual fees while offering mutual funds with annual 
expenses well above 100 basis points. See Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 13, 
at 1502 & n.93 (finding that 48% of plans offering company stock have such high fees that some 
investors would be wise to rationally sacrifice diversification by tilting their portfolio toward 
company stock investments). 
49. Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and the Integration of 
Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 329 (2016). 
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Table 1 
By How Much Must a Risk-Averse Person  
Outperform the Market to Make Holding a  
Single Stock Worthwhile? 
 
   Additional Alpha 
   Required
50 









































Crisis Period  19.10% 
 
Notes: The holding period is one year. The distribution of both the market and single-stock returns is 
constructed by randomly sampling from the historical returns of firms in the CRSP database from 
1926–2015 (i.e., by Monte Carlo simulation). For the market, we use the market-cap-weighted 
average of all of the CRSP firms. We then calculate the real 1-year return for each month for this 
market portfolio during 1926–2015, and then randomly select (with replacement) 100,000 of the 1-
year returns to create a distribution. Similarly, we calculate a 1-year real return for every firm for each 
month during the period and then randomly select 100,000 firm-years. The probability of selection is 
proportional to the firm's market cap as a percent of total market cap at the start of that month. “Crisis” 
periods are defined as any month in which the annualized standard deviation of market returns in the 






50Note that our assumptions bias the estimated alphas downward because we assume the alpha is 
guaranteed. In reality, investors will not know with certainty whether a stock they believe will 
outperform the market will in fact do so. Accounting for this uncertainty increases the required 
alpha for risk-averse investors, sometimes substantially. For example, if the actual alpha is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 2 times the expected alpha, the required alpha for investors 
with CRRA of 4% to 21% in normal periods and 45% in crisis periods. These estimates are 
presented in the Online Appendix to this Article. Ian Ayres & Edward Fox, Appendix to Alpha 
Duties: The Search for Excess Returns and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties,  fig.A1.3 (Jan. 28, 
2019),  https://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/AlphaDutiesAppendix.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9BJE-3ADB].  
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crisisperiods as those in which the annualized standard deviation of market 
returns over the previous month was 25% or more. (Further details on our 
calculations are included the following table.) 
Table 1 teaches several important lessons. First, we can see that rational 
investors, even during regular periods, would require quite substantial alphas 
before foregoing the benefits of diversification. For investors with moderate 
risk aversion (measured by CRRAs between 2–4), the required excess annual 
returns by which an investment would need to be expected to beat the market 
ranges from 6.4% to 15.0%.51 Intuitively, investors with higher levels of risk 
aversion demand greater increases in expected return to bear the same 
increase in risk. Thus, they will require a higher alpha before they are willing 
to bear the same amount of additional idiosyncratic risk.52 As we discuss in 
detail, these large alphas are consistent with the increasing emphasis on the 
importance of diversification in fiduciary law, particularly in trusts, over the 











51. As mentioned in note 48, supra, these estimates are very close to answers for the analogous 
choice between investing in a high-fee mutual fund versus a single (zero alpha) stock. In the latter 
case, the fees on the diversified mutual fund would need to exceed 500 basis points for many 
investors before they would prefer investing in a single stock to the high-fee fund. These extremely 
high fees probably exceed the risk premium that could be reasonably expected by investing in the 
mutual fund or the stock, however. Thus, these investors, if given the choice, would prefer to invest 
primarily in Treasury bonds rather than the 500-basis-point-fee fund or the single stock. 
52. Note that we are assuming that the investors put their entire savings into either the market 
or a single stock and have no other source of income. If an investor has outside income like a salary 
from a safe job, her total wealth/consumption will be less variable, and therefore she will not 
demand quite as large alphas to bear additional idiosyncratic risk. The same is true if that outside 
income comes instead from the investor placing part of her portfolio in safe assets like inflation-
protected government bonds. If an investor keeps 20% of her wealth in safe assets, that reduces the 
alphas by about 20% to 25% depending on her level of risk aversion. In the Online Appendix Table 
A1.2 we re-estimate Table 1 with varying levels of safe income. On the other hand, most of us 
actually bear additional risk through our human capital; our salaries are not safe but instead depend 
on how our firm, the industry in which we work, and the economy as a whole are performing. In 
such cases, risk-averse investors might rationally demand even higher alphas to bear additional 
idiosyncratic risk by owning, say, company stock. 
 
AYRES.LINK&SUBHEAD.FIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  11:26 PM 
2019] Alpha Duties 471 
 
 Second, we see from the table that the alpha required during crisis 
periods is substantially larger than during regular (non-crisis) periods. For 
investors with moderate risk aversion (again measured by CRRAs between 
2–4), the required alpha to forego diversification benefits ranges from 9.9% 
to a whopping 19.1%, ballooning during these crisis times. This is primarily 
because idiosyncratic risk rises during crises. During ordinary periods, the 
idiosyncratic risk (measured as a standard deviation of return) is 27.4%, 
while during crisis periods, the standard deviation is 37.8%. As idiosyncratic 
risk increases, the benefits of diversification increase and therefore the alpha 
required to get investors to give up diversification increases as well.53 
Table 2 estimates the required alpha that would be necessary to 
compensate for bearing different levels of idiosyncratic risk, given different 
levels of systemic risk. 
  
 
53. In addition, crisis periods are defined by increases in systemic risk: during ordinary periods, 
the systemic market risk (measured as a standard deviation of expected return) is 19.2%, while 
during crisis periods the standard deviation is 34.8%. This rise in systemic risk increases risk-averse 
investors’ sensitivity to taking on additional idiosyncratic risk. Put differently, a risk-averse investor 
loses more utility when his total risk (as measured by standard deviation) increases from 20% to 
30% than going from 10% to 20%. Thus, for the same increase in total risk brought on by 
idiosyncratic risk, investors will demand a higher alpha during periods of higher systemic risk. 
 Yet the rise in systemic risk can have offsetting effects. If idiosyncratic risk stays fixed and 
systemic risk increases, the marginal increase in total risk (as measured by standard deviation) from 
the fixed amount of idiosyncratic risk will fall. This is easier to see in an example. Assume 
idiosyncratic risk is 10%, and systemic risk is 10%. In that case, total risk—measured by the 
standard deviation of returns—will be the square root of the idiosyncratic risk squared plus the 
systemic risk squared = (√. 12+. 12 =  14.1%), or 4.1% more than the systemic risk alone. If 
systemic risk now rises to 30%, total risk is √. 12+. 32 = 31.6%, or just 1.6% more than systemic 
risk alone. The decreasing contribution of idiosyncratic risk to total risk can offset the investor’s 
increasing sensitivity to additional risk, to the extent the investor’s utility is affected by the standard 
deviation (rather than the variance) of total risk. In addition, increases in systemic risk can change 
the shape of the distribution of returns. For example, the rise in systemic risk may cause the 
distribution of total returns to become asymmetric, with more returns below the mean than above. 
This would change the “skew” of the distribution. These other effects on the shape of the distribution 
can in theory either increase or decrease the alpha demanded when systemic risk rises. 
 This complex relationship is reflected in Table 2 in which, for a given level of idiosyncratic risk, 
alpha usually rises but sometimes falls as systemic risk rises. 
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Table 2 helps us more clearly see why the required alpha rises during 
crises as both systemic and idiosyncratic risks rise, pushing southeast in the 
table. But the table is also useful in that it allows a more nuanced and specific 
assessment of how much annual alpha is required in particular circumstances. 
The market risk at any time can be estimated by viewing forward-looking 
market volatility measures (such as the VIX), and the idiosyncratic risk can 
be similarly estimated for any stock with traded options.54 Using these two 
inputs, one could assess what alpha was necessary for more particularized 
situations. Thus, for example, we estimate that an Enron employee with 
slightly below-average risk aversion (CRRA = 2) who forewent 
diversification to invest her retirement savings entirely in company stock 
would need to expect at least an average alpha of 10.8%.55 In fact, we have 
created an online widget that lets anyone plug in three variables (a level of 
CRRA risk aversion, a level of market risk, and a level of idiosyncratic risk 
for a particular stock) to determine the alpha required to take on the additional 
idiosyncratic risk.56 
The results above barely budge if we instead use the Fama–
French three-factor model to measure the amount of uncompensated risk 
inherent in holding an average stock. As noted above, Eugene Fama and 
Kenneth French have shown that a stock’s relative market capitalization and 
the ratio of its book value to market value also help predict its return, along 
with market exposure. They hypothesize that a stock’s market exposure is an 
incomplete measure of the kinds of undiversifiable risk faced by its owners, 
and these other two factors proxy for these other risks, which help drive 
 
54. A call (or put) option gives the owner the right to purchase (or sell) for a given price in the 
future. The value of these options depends in part on the expected volatility of the underlying stock 
from now until the option’s expiration. Thus, when investors buy or sell options, they are, in part, 
placing an implicit bet on the volatility of the stock, and we can back out the market’s prediction 
for a stock’s future volatility from its option prices. Using this forward-looking measure of the 
stock’s total volatility, we can capture the idiosyncratic part by regression or otherwise controlling 
for forward-looking measures of market volatility, like the VIX. See Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 
46, app. at 14 fig.A-8 (2015) (charting S&P 100 firms’ idiosyncratic risk derived from market-
traded options’ implied volatilities), https://sites.google.com/site/volatilityspikesappendix/ 
[https://perma.cc/PDQ5-RAFU]. 
55. To calculate this figure, we estimate an alpha for each day from January 1, 1999, to 
October 1, 2001, shortly before the Enron scandal finally broke, and then take the average. The 
calculation uses the implied volatility method discussed supra in note 50 to give forward-looking 
measures of systemic and implied volatility. Although we do not model it here, we emphasize that 
investing in company stock can be particularly risky because the employee’s own human capital 
may be disproportionately exposed to idiosyncratic risk of her company. See Shlomo Benartzi, 
Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Company Stock, 56 J. FIN. 1747, 
1747–48 (2001) (explaining that “because employees select a stock that is presumably correlated 
with their human capital,” they risk the loss of “both their retirement savings and their jobs if the 
company fails”). 
56. https://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/AlphaWidget.xlsx; Ian Ayres & Edward 
Fox, By How Much Must a Risk-Averse Person Outperform the Market to Make Holding a Single 
Stock Worthwhile (2018) (Microsoft Excel spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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returns.57 Nevertheless, when we use the Fama–French model to measure 




Of course, most alpha investment opportunities are not quite so extreme 
as to require investing in a single stock. While the previous tables have 
focused on all-or-nothing tradeoffs, in most real-world settings investors are 
only required to partially de-diversify in order to reap higher expected 
returns. For example, some investors may invest all their savings in an 
actively managed mutual or hedge fund that invests in several stocks that the 
fund’s managers believe will outperform the stock market generally. 
 
57. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and 
Evidence, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2004, at 25, 38 (describing the effects of size and book-to-


































































Additional Alpha Required to Invest in a Single Stock 
Using Different Measures of Idiosyncratic Risk
Controlling for Market Proxy Only
Controlling for Fama French 3 Factor Model
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Investing heavily in sector funds also sacrifices some potential diversification 
because the investor’s portfolio bears the risk particular to that industry 
instead of diversifying it away by investing in the other sectors of the 
economy. These partially diversified positions also require offsetting alphas 
(but not as much as alpha opportunities that invest in a single stock). 
To investigate how much alpha is required to compensate an investor 
for only partially diversifying, we perform another set of simulations based 
on historical data. In particular, in each year from 1926 to 2015, we randomly 
choose 1,000 representative portfolios with a given number of stocks (e.g., 
20 stocks or 50 stocks). We then calculate how much idiosyncratic risk 
remains in these partially diversified portfolios and, using the figures 
underlying Table 2, convert this level of idiosyncratic risk into an alpha. 58 






58. The portfolios are representative in the sense that the probability of selecting a stock in the 
portfolio is proportional to the market capitalization of that firm over the course of the year. 
Note that our method of calculating alpha for 20 or 50 firm portfolios using the data underlying 
Table 2 may in some cases overstate the alpha required.  Using the data from Table 2 implicitly 
assumes that the 20 and 50 stock firm distributions look like individual firm distributions with the 
same level of total risk, but this may not be true.  In particular, the 20 and 50 stock portfolios are 
likely less prone to extremely low (or high) returns than individual firms, even if the distributions 
have the same standard deviation.  This would mean the 20 and 50 stock portfolios would have 
“thinner tails.” In the Online Appendix, we present an alternate version of Figure 7 using the normal 
distribution instead of Monte-Carlo simulations to convert the additional risk imposed by the 20 and 
50 stock portfolios into an alpha figure, which produces somewhat smaller—although still 
substantial—alphas.    
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Notes: Each portfolio of 20 and 50 stocks for each year is created by drawing stocks randomly 
(without replacement), where the probability of selection is proportional to the stock’s average 
market capitalization over the year. The portfolio return is also market capitalization weighted (i.e., 
the return of large firms has a larger effect on the portfolio returns than small firms). We draw 1,000 
random portfolios of 20 and 50 stocks each year. We calculate the remaining idiosyncratic risk in 
each portfolio and take the average across the 1,000 portfolios and then calculate an alpha associated 
with that average idiosyncratic risk and the level of market risk in that year for an investor with a 
CRRA coefficient equal to 2. 
 
Figure 7 reveals that the required level of compensating alpha is, as 
theory would predict, substantially lower for partially diversified portfolios. 
While the average annual compensating alpha for a single stock over this 
time period is 5.71%, we find that this drops to 0.70% when investing in 20 
stocks and to 0.39% when investing in 50 stocks. But importantly, the figure 
shows that even with 50 stocks there are 5 separate years where the required 
offsetting alpha is at least 1%. It is often suggested that investors can achieve 
the most important benefits of diversification by investing in just 10 or 20 
different stocks,59 but our estimates show substantial variation in the requisite 
 
59. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 640 
(2017) (citing empirical evidence that investing in 10 or 20 different stocks achieves more than 88% 
of diversification’s advantages). We are not in fact the first to observe the need, sometimes, to hold 
more than 20 stocks to eliminate the vast majority of idiosyncratic risk. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, 
A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL 



























Additional Alpha Needed to Compensate Investor
for Holding 20, or 50 Stock Portfolio Instead of the Market
50 Stock Portfolio 20 Stock Portfolio
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alpha necessary to justify even relatively small departures from full 
diversification. During periods with relatively high systemic risk, then, 
adding even small amounts of potentially diversifiable idiosyncratic risk can 
necessitate substantial alphas. If the normal risk premium for holding non-
diversifiable market risk is 4%, then the alpha-adjusted risk premium 
required for adding on just the idiosyncratic risk of a 50-stock portfolio is 
frequently 25% higher.60 The takeaway here is that even partially diversified 
investment opportunities can at times require relatively substantial alpha to 
make such an investment utility-enhancing. As explained below, these results 
suggest that the usual rule of thumb about how much diversification is 
“enough” may be too loose. 
C.  Exposure Costs 
Finally, we estimate the “beta” costs of being non-optimally exposed to 
the equity risk premium. As discussed above, beta costs can come in two 
forms: one can have too little equity exposure (as when a 23-year-old invests 
all her savings in money market funds), or one might have too much equity 
exposure (as when a risk-averse 70-year-old with a modest nest egg invests 
all her savings in stock). And while beta costs often also require sacrificing 
diversification when an alpha investment is lumpy, in this section we isolate 
the compensating alpha required to offset having to take on inefficiently high 
or low beta. (In other words, we assume that there are no diversification or 










to eliminate the vast majority of idiosyncratic risk). From 2013 to 2017, idiosyncratic risk fell again, 
making the environment closer to the one studied in the older papers which find smaller numbers 
of stocks sufficient. See generally Söhnke M. Bartram, Gregory W. Brown & René M. Stulz, Why 
Has Idiosyncratic Risk Been Historically Low in Recent Years? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 24270, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24270 [https://perma.cc/XD5R-
8JVU] (finding idiosyncratic risk since 2013 has been low compared to historical averages and 
particularly compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s). The recent rise in systemic risk in the final 
quarter of 2018, however, suggests that idiosyncratic risk has risen again. These secular fluctuations 
and in particular their cyclicality, however, has largely escaped notice in the legal literature. But see 
Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 46, at 336 fig.2, 397 (analyzing cyclical increases of idiosyncratic 
risk). 
60. 5% = 4% + 1% is 25% higher than 4%. 
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As emphasized above, the notion of a beta error is only comprehensible 
if we have a background idea of what an optimal exposure to equities would 
be. That optimal level is intuitively a function of a particular investor’s level 
of risk aversion, which might (or might not) increase as she ages. In the 
following table, we assume that the optimal equity exposure is determined 
by the Merton share described above (as βM) so that investors with higher 
constant relative risk aversion would optimally choose to have lower 
exposures to equity.61 Applying a historical distribution of returns to the 
market portfolio and risk premiums, we can calculate the ideal β for an 
investor with any level of risk aversion. Taking investors with ideal β’s of 
0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, and 1 as examples, we then estimate how much alpha they 
would require to depart from their ideal β in Table 3 following.62 
  
 
61. For example, an investor expecting a 4.15% risk premium, 21% equity return standard 
deviation, and with a CRRA of 2 would optimally invest 47% of her saving in equities, while an 
investor with the same expectation but a CRRA of 4 would optimally invest only 23% in equities. 
62. Observe that the assumptions underlying Table 3 use the CAPM result that the equity 
premium is fully explained by market risk (as measured by β). In fact, tests have shown that while 
higher β firms have higher expected returns, this does not usually explain the entire equity premium. 
E.g., Fama & French, supra note 57, at 32.. 
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In Table 3, one can see the offsetting alphas from having too much or 
too little exposure to equities.63 The table shows that investors are more 
sensitive to beta deviations as they become more risk averse. For example, 
an investor with a βM = 0.3 would need an annual alpha of 0.3% before 
making a beta deviation of 0.2, while an investor with a βM = 0.7 would only 
need an alpha of 0.1% for making that-sized beta deviation. More generally, 
the alpha required for putting risk-averse investors in high beta investments 
are substantially higher than the alphas required of relatively risk-neutral 
investors in low beta investments. Hence, we see in the diagonal corners of 
Table 3 that the alpha required for putting a βM = 0.1 investor into a β = 1 
portfolio is a whopping 21.4%, while the alpha required for putting a βM = 1 
investor in a β = 0.1 portfolio is only 1.8%. As we discuss below, this result 
accords with how fiduciary law has generally approached the question of beta 
mistakes: not investing aggressively enough is harmful, particularly over 
time, but the most damaging beta mistake in the short term is exposing a 
highly risk-averse client—a widow who is the sole beneficiary of a small 
trust set up for her maintenance—to too much risk. 
In most real-world contexts, the estimates in Table 3 for lumpy 
investments should be seen as lower bounds on the required alphas for 
portfolio deviations from optimal betas. This is because the lumpiness of the 
investments usually entails some degree of diversification loss. The 
opportunity to invest a substantial portion of your portfolio in a friend’s start-
up, for example, might force your portfolio above your optimal beta and 
expose your portfolio to idiosyncratic risk. Accordingly, in such 
circumstances it will be necessary in calculating the required alpha to account 
for (and offset) both types of losses. For example, if investing all of your 
savings in a friend’s start-up caused you, a βM = 0.5 (↔CRRA ≈ 2) investor, 
to take on β = 1 portfolio and expose your portfolio to average non-crisis 
idiosyncratic and market risk, then you would need at least an alpha of 7.6%: 
6.4% to compensate for the diversification loss (as shown in Table 1) and an 
additional alpha of 1.2% to compensate for the beta loss (as shown in 
Table 3).64  
 
63. For example, an investor who, ignoring the offsetting benefits of alpha opportunities would 
want to invest half of her savings in equities (βM = 0.5), would need an offsetting annual alpha of 
0.2% before wanting to invest her savings in a portfolio with a β of 0.7. Reading up and down 
individual columns, the table reveals substantial symmetry in the size of the offsetting alpha with 
regard to movements above or below the ideal beta. Thus, the same investor (with βM = 0.5) would 
also require an offsetting alpha of 0.2% before wanting to invest in a portfolio with a similarly sized 
beta deviation of 0.3. 
64. As discussed supra in note 35, an investor’s ideal β for a lumpy investment with 
idiosyncratic risk will be lower than her ideal beta for investing in a diversified portfolio. Thus, in 
this case, the beta error is actually worse than it first appears, and the total alpha will be higher than 
one would calculate by adding the relevant numbers from Table 1 and Table 3. 
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D.  Tilting Mistakes 
While most of our foregoing estimates concern discrete investment 
opportunities, there are many real-world opportunities that give investors the 
option of varying the proportion of their portfolio that is invested. In such 
“non-lumpy” circumstances, theory suggests that an investor will want to 
“tilt” her portfolio toward alpha opportunities by overweighting the portfolio 
share of the alpha opportunity, even though this overweighting will expose 
the investor to some idiosyncratic risk. In this section, we investigate how 
much a person should invest in a non-lumpy alpha opportunity given two key 
variables: the size of the alpha and the total risk of alpha opportunity.65 As 
with beta mistakes, tilting mistakes can come in two varieties: (1) an investor 
can under-tilt by putting too small a proportion of her portfolio in the non-
lumpy alpha opportunity or (2) the investor can over-tilt by putting too large 
a proportion of her portfolio in the alpha opportunity. 
Table 4 estimates the optimal tilt for an investor with moderate risk 
aversion (CRRA = 2) depending on the size of the alpha and the riskiness of 
the alpha opportunity, fixing the riskiness of the market (20% standard 
deviation), the β of the alpha opportunity (β = 1), and the risk premium for 
holding the market portfolio instead of risk-free assets (5%). 
 
65. Here we measure total risk as the standard deviation of investing 100% of the portfolio in 
the alpha opportunity. In equilibrium, however, the total risk of the optimal portfolio will normally 
be reduced (toward the market risk), by investing only a portion of the portfolio in the alpha 
opportunity. 
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Table 4 shows that when 100% tilting would expose the investor to 
relatively small additional idiosyncratic risk, that relatively small alpha is 
necessary to induce an investor to want to put all of her portfolio in the alpha 
opportunity. For example, if going full-tilt only increases the total risk 
standard deviation of return by 1 percentage point (from 20% to 21%), then 
Table 4 shows that an alpha of just 1% would be sufficient to induce an 
investor to want to invest all of her portfolio in the alpha opportunity (even 
though she has the non-lumpy option to invest a lesser proportion). 
But as the cost of tilting increases, investors will optimally invest a 
lower proportion of their portfolio in the alpha opportunity. Thus, we see if a 
1% alpha opportunity has an associated total risk of 30%, an optimal investor 
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(with a CRRA risk aversion of 2) should want to invest only 9% of her 
portfolio in the alpha opportunity. Under these circumstances, investing less 
than 9% of one’s portfolio would represent an under-tilting error, while 
investing more than 9% would represent an over-tilting error. We conjecture 
in real-world settings that over-tilting is the more important error. Retail 
investors who are not aware of the size of the gains from diversification 
frequently hold only a few stocks, or even only stock in their company. Even 
if these investors believe the stocks will outperform the market, they are 
probably making a mistake by treating those stocks as though they require 
large minimum investments (as a share of the investor’s portfolio). Although 
there are situations in which the alpha is so great that one would want to hold 
only the alpha investment even if it is “non-lumpy”—as in the northeast 
corner of Table 4—these situations will be relatively rare in the real world, 
because they require very large alphas (or very small idiosyncratic risk). 
Stepping back, we have provided in this Part some of the first estimates 
of the minimum alphas that are required to offset diversification and beta 
losses,66 as well as excessive fees. But for a variety of reasons, these estimates 
should be viewed as ballpark measures. For example, our estimates on 
diversification losses assume that investors have a particular form of 
(constant relative) risk aversion. Other types of risk aversion are less 
mathematically tractable but might be more empirically relevant and give rise 
to alternative estimates.67 In addition, we have not modeled investors’ 
exposure to the market through their human capital.68 Also, our estimates 
have assumed that investors “know” a variety of variables, including the 
alpha of particular investment opportunities and the levels of idiosyncratic 
and market risk. But in many situations, investors are likely to have varying 
 
66. The importance of diversification, fees, and appropriate exposure to market risk has long 
been understood, but we are unaware of other work that has systematically converted the losses 
from sacrificing diversification or beta mistakes into an alpha required to justify them. Doing so is 
informative because most work simply treats failure to fully diversify or expose one’s portfolio to 
the right level of market risk as an important mistake, but does not tell us when these costs are worth 
bearing. 
67. Scholars have also at times analyzed constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and 
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA). See Daniele Schiliró, Bounded Rationality and Perfect 
Rationality: Psychology into Economics, 3 THEORETICAL & PRAC. RES. ECON. FIELDS 101, 107 
(2012) (listing alternative utility functions). But see Brunnermeier & Nagel, supra note 20, at 733 
(suggesting that constant relative risk aversion is a reasonable way to approximate risk aversion); 
Chiappori & Paiella, supra note 20, at 1024 (same). 
68. See supra notes 52, 55. Our estimates of diversification losses may also be too high if 
investors are saving for retirement and have a lot of control over when they will retire and are 
relatively indifferent about this date. This option value—to work longer if the market does poorly—
may effectively reduce investor’s risk aversion. See generally Emmanuel Farhi & Stavros Panageas, 
Saving and Investing for Early Retirement: A Theoretical Analysis, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 87 (2007) 
(exploring a model in which investors choose their retirement dates based in part on market 
performance and finding that this can cause investors to effectively exhibit less risk aversion when 
the market does well). 
 
AYRES.LINK&SUBHEAD.FIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  11:26 PM 
484 Texas Law Review [Vol. 97:445 
 
degrees of confidence in their beliefs about alpha and these other variables. 
While the expected market volatility is derivable from options prices,69 
investors’ beliefs about idiosyncratic risk and alphas might be less precise. 
For risk-averse individuals, less precise beliefs about alpha should militate 
toward demanding even higher alphas because uncertainty about alpha is 
another form of risk.70 
Even with these caveats, the take-home result of this section is that 
investors need to have reasonable expectations that an investment will 
substantially beat the market before being willing to take on diversification, 
beta, and excess-fees losses. Financial economists normally expect that 
stocks will beat government treasuries by somewhere between 3 and 6 
percentage points. But an investor who puts all her savings in a single stock 
would need an additional alpha of at least twice this amount (6.4% in Table 1) 
and during crisis periods an alpha of nearly 10% annually. Moreover, if the 
opportunity requires the investor to pay excessive fees, the alpha should be 
calculated net of this excess, and if the investment necessitated a beta 
deviation, an additional alpha to offset the exposure loss would be required. 
Investment opportunities with alphas of these magnitudes are not impossible, 
but they are likely to be sufficiently rare that the law should be quite 
concerned when fiduciaries advise clients to take on substantial 
diversification, beta, or excess-fees costs, or in the case of trustees, directly 
invest the beneficiaries’ funds in that manner. 
Our concern with the mistaken pursuit of alpha that is not cost justified 
(Type I errors) leads us to argue below for interpreting fiduciary law to more 
robustly deter these mistakes. Our goal is, of course, to protect investors. One 
might object, however, that more complex interests are also at stake. 
Investors who make alpha bets after seeking out new information or engaging 
in fundamental valuation of firms help align prices with the discounted  
cash-flow value of the businesses. This in turn, over the long run, allows the 
capital markets to allocate scarce capital to the most productive enterprises. 
Fiduciaries who guide investors to the low-cost, well-diversified baseline by 
investing in various passive mutual funds and ETFs, by contrast, are to a 
degree free-riders who do not contribute to price accuracy. Thus, arguably, 
 
69. Faith in the VIX as an accurate measure of expected market volatility has, however, 
decreased in part because of the unexplainable decline under the Trump presidency during 2017 
despite a number of seemingly relevant increases in risk-factors during that period. E.g., Dani 
Burger, The Mystery of the Stubbornly-Low Volatility Index Is Deepening, BLOOMBERG 
(May 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-03/do-volatility-tracking-
securities-keep-the-vix-artificially-low [https://perma.cc/884M-BDD]. As of late 2018, the VIX had 
in fact risen substantially, more than doubling from its low during 2017. CBOE Volatility Index 
(^VIX), YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 1, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EVIX/ 
[https://perma.cc/6XK4-K86H]. 
70. See supra note 47. 
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our proposed reforms could reduce price accuracy and, eventually, economic 
performance. 
We take this concern seriously but believe it will have limited effect for 
a few reasons. First, to the extent our proposals are aimed at retail investors, 
we think such investors probably do relatively little in the way of price 
discovery. If we can reduce the number of people who use the broker window 
in their IRA or 401(k) plans to invest in individual stocks, this will have little 
effect on how closely market prices track fundamental value. Indeed, because 
most of these individuals are likely to be “noise traders,”71 convincing them 
to stop investing in individual stocks might even improve price accuracy.  
Reducing investment in high-fee, actively managed mutual funds, by 
contrast, might well marginally reduce price accuracy. It is worth 
distinguishing between two types of actively managed funds: (1) those 
which, after fees and de-diversification costs, break even compared with 
comparable passive indices and (2) those which, after fees and de-
diversification costs, perform worse than those indices. The funds in the latter 
category cost more than they contribute in price accuracy.72 Crimping 
investment in these funds will improve investor welfare while likely having 
a modest effect on price accuracy. Our proposal is not intended to limit 
investment in funds in the first category, which charge higher fees but obtain 
enough alpha to exactly offset those costs. These funds may do a significant 
amount of price discovery.73 To the extent fiduciaries eschew these break-
even funds under our proposals, say because recommending investing in 
passive funds is a clearer way to avoid potential liability, a meaningful 
amount of price discovery may be lost.  
Nevertheless, if price accuracy does decline, the problem will be largely 
 
71. Noise traders are investors who often follow fads or invest based on information that is 
already impounded in the stock price. See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long et al., The Size and Incidence 
of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN. 681, 683 (1989) (contrasting noise traders with rational 
investors). 
72. There may be positive externalities from increasing price accuracy, such that high-fee, 
actively managed funds do not capture the full social gains of their price discovery as part of their 
trading profits (putting aside the fees they charge). In this case, the fact that the private costs to the 
funds exceed the trading profits they capture does not mean that it is economically inefficient for 
them to continue. Even assuming this is true, the current system is problematic if Type I errors for 
investors and fiduciaries are common. A rational system would not rely on ignorance and agency 
problems to induce investors to unwittingly subsidize price discovery by high-fee funds. Instead, 
we would subsidize all forms of socially valuable price discovery. 
73. It may seem unrealistic to think many funds are in this knife-edge case, but in fact, as 
Jonathan Berk and Richard Green have observed, if there is a competitive market for talented 
investment managers who can generate alpha (at least when managing small portfolios) and one 
makes some other assumptions, we will find many of these knife-edge funds. The intuition is, partly, 
that the investment managers will simply end up keeping the alpha they are able to produce, leading 
to funds whose after-fee performance matches the passive indices. See Jonathan B. Berk & Richard 
C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 
1269–72 (2004) (laying out a model which produces only these knife-edge funds). 
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self-correcting. As price accuracy falls, the expected gains from making 
alpha bets through fundamental valuation or information discovery will 
increase. This will induce direct investors, and fiduciaries under our rules, to 
direct more clients into funds making alpha bets based on fundamental 
valuation or information discovery. Finally, in an era when the financial 
sector has earned as much as 40% of total corporate profits,74 many people 
are reasonably concerned that we have devoted too many resources to finance 
and that many of the activities that are profitable for financial-sector firms do 
not have commensurate social gains. Reducing the investment in funds that 
do not earn enough alpha to outweigh their excess fees and the costs of failing 
to diversify might then be thought of as a salutary reduction in excessive 
resources devoted to finance. 
IV.  Legal Implications 
The last two Parts analyzed the theoretical and empirical tradeoffs that 
often arise when investors pursue alpha investment opportunities. This Part 
develops the legal implications of these tradeoffs. More particularly, we 
describe what we call “alpha duties,” the legal duties that investment 
fiduciaries should have before recommending alpha investments or investing 
in such opportunities on their clients’ behalf.  
This Part is organized around three types of fiduciaries: (a) trustees, 
(b) broker–dealers and investor advisers, and (c) 401(k) plan managers. The 
next section on trustees lays out the core limitations concerning 
recommendation and actual investment in alpha opportunities, while the 
subsequent sections explore specialized questions regarding upgraded 
licensing requirements of broker–dealers and investment advisers as well as 
“alpha-tized” 401(k) menu selections and fintech warnings. 
A.  Trustees 
Trust law is typically thought of in the context of personal gratuitous 
transfers.75 These kinds of trusts are important: U.S. banks and trust 
companies held more than $600 billion in assets as trustees of personal trusts 
in 2017.76 This figure understates the true size of personal trusts because it 
 
74. See Jordan Weissmann, How Wall Street Devoured Corporate America, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/how-wall-street-devoured-corporate 
-america/273732/ [https://perma.cc/9KEK-GTPG] (attributing 40% of corporate profits in the early 
2000s to Wall Street). 
75. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of 
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1997) (observing that this view of trust law dominates how 
trust law is taught, where it is codified in statutes, etc.). 
76. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS: STANDARD 
REPORT #3 (2017), https://www5.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp?formname=standard 
[https://perma.cc/D9FG-N2NN] (reporting over $600 billion in total fiduciary and related assets in 
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does not include those with trustees who are individuals (rather than entities), 
and other commentators have estimated that personal trusts have at least 
$1 trillion in assets.77 
In addition, much of what we say here applies to retirement accounts 
governed by ERISA. As the Supreme Court recently observed in Tibble v. 
Edison International:78 “We have often noted that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty 
is ‘derived from the common law of trusts.’ In determining the contours of 
an ERISA fiduciary’s duty, courts often must look to the law of trusts.”79 As 
of 2014 there were about $5.3 trillion invested in defined contribution ERISA 
plans (mostly 401(k) plans) and $3.0 trillion in defined benefit plans 
(traditional pension plans in which the employer promises a fixed payout 
schedule).80 Again, these accounts constitute the majority of ordinary 
Americans’ savings not invested in housing. We discuss some issues peculiar 
to 401(k)s in the final section of this Part. 
In the rest of this subpart, we discuss the basics of trust law, including 
the trustee’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence. The duty of prudence 
is in turn broken down into many subsidiary duties when applied to trust 
investing. We address the implications of our results for three of these 
subsidiary duties, which are well-recognized under current law: (1) the duty 
to diversify, (2) the duty to take on only risk appropriate for the beneficiary’s 
circumstances, and (3) the duty to incur only reasonable costs. The law 
regarding the first two of these duties has evolved substantially over the last 
thirty years. In their modern form, these three duties restrain trustees from 
making the three central investment mistakes when there is no justification 
for doing so. The development of the law has been less complete, however, 
in using these duties to ensure alpha seeking is worth the cost, and we show 
how our work can help trustees and courts make better decisions on this 
question. 
We then argue that taken together these three duties impose what we 
have called “alpha duties” on trustees. Under these duties, trustees should 
calculate the cost of a given alpha-seeking strategy in terms of under-
diversification, excess fees and costs, and non-optimal exposure, and 
 
personal trust and agency accounts for 2017). 
77. See James R. Hines Jr., Efficient and Impartial Trust Investing 1 (August 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of California, Berkeley School of Law 
Scholarship Repository), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091 
&context=law_econ [https://perma.cc/597M-U4PM] (estimating that U.S. trusts have “aggregate 
assets that comfortably exceed one trillion dollars”). 
78. 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015). 
79. Id. at 1828 (citation omitted). 
80. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN 
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compare that to a reasonable estimate of the expected alpha to decide whether 
a strategy is prudent. These alpha duties accord with the Third Restatement’s 
approach to prudent active investment.81 The duties also serve as a model for 
what we would propose for fiduciaries in other situations. 
 
1. Trust Basics.—A trust separates the legal and beneficial ownership of 
property. The trustee is by default given all the powers over the property of 
an owner to manage and invest it for the advantage of the beneficiaries.82 It 
should also be noted that most trust law is default law—i.e., the person 
creating the trust (the settlor) can usually opt out if she chooses—but the 
default is nevertheless highly influential.83 
 
2. The Trustee’s Fiduciary Duties.—A trustee has two main duties: 
(1) loyalty and (2) prudence, as well as a variety of subsidiary obligations, 
which are “applications of prudence and loyalty.”84 Trust law has long 
contained a stringent duty of loyalty that requires the trustee to manage the 
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.85 While there have been 
incremental changes, the scope of the duty of loyalty has been largely stable 
for over a century. 
 
3. Prudence.—By contrast, the duty of prudence, as it applies to trust 
investments, has undergone substantial changes over the last thirty or so 
years. Prior to the 1980s, most states limited the types of property a trustee 
could invest in either through formal lists or the “constrained prudent man 
rule.” Both doctrines channeled trust property into bonds or real property and 
banned investment in some or all equities.86 The rules frequently prevented 
 
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. (h)(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
82. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 815 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) [hereinafter UTC]; UNIFORM 
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(e) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
83. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment 
Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 681, 682 (2007) (finding that after states 
adopted new prudent-investor rules, institutional trustees held about 1.5–4.5 percentage points more 
equities and less “safe” investments). 
84. John H. Langbein, Rise of the Management Trust, TR. & EST., Oct. 2004, at 52, 54. 
Fiduciary duties are not the only possible disciplining forces for trustees. Market forces provide 
some check on commercial trustees who can garner new clients by showing superior investment 
returns. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 83–84 (1987) (acknowledging that “demonstrably superior performance of a 
common trust fund helps attract new assets to manage”). This seems likely to be insufficient on its 
own given the difficulty of separating skill and luck, particularly by trust settlors and others who 
are usually not investment professionals. 
85. See, e.g., In re Will of Gleeson, 124 N.E.2d 624, 627–28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954) (holding the 
trustee liable under the “no further inquiry rule” where the trustee benefited from a transaction with 
trust property, even though the transaction was arguably in the best interest of the beneficiaries). 
86. See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 
81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644–45 (1996). 
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trustees from giving beneficiaries enough exposure to equities—i.e., the rules 
forced trustees to make beta mistakes by investing with too low betas—and 
during the high inflation periods in the 1970s and 1980s, bond-heavy trust 
portfolios floundered. In addition, it was unclear in some states whether there 
was a duty to diversify.87 These rules ran counter to the finance research and 
practice, discussed above.88 
Observing these failures, trust-law reformers succeeded during the 1990s 
in breaking down the previous constrained approach. The 1994 Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act (UPIA), eventually adopted in 45 states, abrogated bans 
on investing in categories of risky assets and instead requires the trustee 
simply to “invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by 
considering the purposes . . . [and] circumstances of the trust.”89 The 
remaining states adopted similar measures, although not based on the UPIA 
language. 
Although the prudent investor standard provides useful flexibility, some 
commentators have complained that it fails to prevent trustees from investing 
in portfolios that are too risky for the beneficiaries.90 Likewise, while the 
UPIA clarified the importance of the duty to diversify, it provides relatively 
little guidance as to how much diversification is enough or when 
circumstances make a relatively undiversified portfolio prudent. Our results 
can help to address these problems by fleshing out the meaning of appropriate 
risk and the duty to diversify under the Act. 
 
4. Subsidiary Duties: Prudent Diversification.—Under the UPIA (and the 
Restatement), the trustee has a duty to diversify the trust portfolio “unless the 
trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the 
purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying.”91 The official 
 
87. Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investor 
Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 864 n.71 (2010). 
88. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act’s prefatory note observes: 
Over the quarter century from the late 1960’s the investment practices of fiduciaries 
experienced significant change. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) undertakes 
to update trust investment law in recognition of the alterations that have occurred in 
investment practice. These changes have occurred under the influence of a large and 
broadly accepted body of empirical and theoretical knowledge about the behavior of 
capital markets, often described as “modern portfolio theory.” 
UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT intro. note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
89. Id. § 2; John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power 
to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 390 n.113 (2010). 
90. See Sterk, supra note 82, at 892 (arguing that the reformers “inadvertently . . . incentivized 
trustees to overemphasize potential returns even at the cost of excessive risk”). 
91. UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 90(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“[T]he trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust 
unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so.”). There is a robust debate about whether 
the duty to diversify is simply a default that can be waived for nearly any reason or is mandatory 
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comment lists two common circumstances in which not diversifying might 
be prudent: (1) if the trust consists in part of property with a low tax basis or 
(2) if the trust contains a family business. In addition, trust law permits 
prudent active management of trust assets,92 which entails not fully 
diversifying. 
Although the UPIA does not necessarily set up a formal shifting of the 
burden of persuasion or of going forward, the text of the rule, at a minimum, 
makes it incumbent on the trustee to make a showing that her decision was 
reasonable, if she fails to diversify.93 But that begs the question: how much 
concentration of the trust portfolio must a complaining beneficiary show 
before the trustee owes an explanation? The leading textbook in trusts and 
estates notes the received wisdom:  
In light of the studies showing that diversifying into 20 to 30 unrelated 
large capitalization stocks removes most of the diversifiable risk from 
a stock portfolio, a good rule of thumb is that a concentration in a 
single security of more than 5 percent requires explanation.94 
Our work shows that during volatile periods when idiosyncratic risk is 
high, this rule of thumb is probably too loose. A random, market-weighted, 
portfolio of 50 stocks will have few or no stocks with concentrations above 
5%, but will still impose high costs during volatile periods. These under-
diversification costs have been up to 150 basis points per year for moderately 
risk-averse beneficiaries during unsettled periods.95 By comparison, during 
calm periods like 2003–2007 and 2011–2015, a random market-weighted 
 
unless the settlor has a sensible reason to waive it. John Langbein argues that a trust instrument that 
waives the duty of diversification and directs the trustee to hold only one publicly traded stock, for 
example, would be so likely to impair the value of the trust that courts should strike the requirement 
because it runs afoul of the rule that trusts must benefit the beneficiaries. John H. Langbein, 
Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1112–15 (2004). But see Jeffrey 
A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and the Future of Trust 
Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1166–71 (2008) (arguing the benefit-the-beneficiaries 
standard does not impede terms that are likely foolish, like requiring the retention of only one stock, 
but not illegal, immoral, or against public policy). 
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2). 
93. See, e.g., In re HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 947 N.Y.S.2d 292, 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) 
(“[T]he prudent investor rule puts diversification at the forefront of the fiduciary’s obligations, but 
allows leeway for the fiduciary to opt out if the beneficiaries require otherwise . . . .”). The official 
comments to the UPIA note that “[t]here is no automatic rule for identifying how much 
diversification is enough.” UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 cmt. 
94. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 55, at 640. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 
comment h(2) also observes that in a hypothetical example, 20 stocks selected to provide 
diversification likely met the duty to diversify. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2), 
illus. 14. Our results do not necessarily contradict this but do show that holding 20 stocks selected 
without considering diversification should usually not be found to meet the duty to diversify during 
periods of high idiosyncratic risk like periods of market upheaval. 
95. See supra Figure 6 (additional alpha required to hold random 50-stock portfolio for 
CRRA = 2 investor instead of market index). 
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portfolio of 10 stocks would have imposed much smaller—although still 
important—average costs of about 60 basis points for the same investor. This 
is true despite the 10-stock portfolio raising serious red flags under the 5% 
concentration rule of thumb, while the 50-stock portfolio would not.96 During 
volatile periods, concentrations of the trust corpus in individual stocks of 
more than about 3 percentage points over the firm’s share of the market as a 
whole97 should usually be considered not diversified, triggering an 
explanation from the trustee.98 If a trustee cannot always quickly shift the 
portfolio from active management to broad diversification as soon as 
idiosyncratic risk rises, this suggests the trustee should be more concerned 
about potential diversification costs even during calm periods than our results 
above would otherwise indicate.  
The arguments above apply with equal force to trustees of defined 
benefit employee retirement plans under ERISA. These trustees are under a 
statutory duty to diversify, like the trustees of personal trusts under the UPIA 
and the Restatement.99 For these ERISA fiduciaries, the duty of 
diversification should likewise be stricter during periods of upheaval when 
the value of diversification increases.100 
To give a concrete sense of how our work can provide guidance for 
courts evaluating whether trustees have fulfilled their duty to diversify, 
consider a private trust that has invested all of the trust’s assets in a single 
stock.101 Assume the trustee justifies the failure to diversify because selling 
 
96. Tightening the rule of thumb has real costs in potentially increasing the number of fiduciary 
suits and forcing the trustee to spend more time recording her reasons for holding a concentrated 
position. Still, rearranging the rule of thumb to slide depending on whether it is a relatively calm or 
relatively volatile period could improve the trustee’s incentives without raising total costs.  
97. The same is true if the trustee indirectly holds an equivalent position through actively 
managed mutual funds or some other mechanism. 
98. Note that the rule of thumb works only one way. A portfolio that passes the “test” is not 
necessarily prudently diversified. For example, a portfolio holding only U.S. stocks with no 
exposure to other risky assets like real estate, international equities, or bonds may not be 
appropriately diversified. 
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2006); see also Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 
(2015) (citing the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts in determining an ERISA fiduciary’s 
duties); James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
483, 507–08, 513–16 (2013) (examining the relationship between ERISA, the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts, and the prudent investor rule). 
100. There is some evidence that alpha may be easier to obtain during periods of upheaval. See, 
e.g., Robert Kosowski, Do Mutual Funds Perform When It Matters Most to Investors? US Mutual 
Fund Performance and Risk in Recessions and Expansions, 1 Q.J. FIN. 607 (2011) (finding that 
actively managed mutual funds tend to overperform during recessions even though they 
underperform on average). This would have a countervailing effect on the desirability of 
diversification during crisis periods: offsetting alphas rise during these periods but the probability 
of obtaining a given-size alpha may increase. If the latter effect is real, these two effects would need 
to be weighed against each other. 
101. We provide simplified examples in this subsection and address below complicating issues 
like how the trustee is supposed to determine the beneficiary’s level of risk aversion, how her other 
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the stock would trigger a capital gains tax realization. In this case, the alpha 
the trustee hopes to obtain is from the tax savings and is readily calculable. 
For simplicity, imagine the stock has a 0 tax basis, average idiosyncratic risk, 
and a single beneficiary with moderate risk aversion (with a CRRA 
coefficient of 2) during a relatively calm period. We calculated (in Table 1, 
supra) the benefit of diversifying would be equivalent to adding 6.3% to the 
return to the stock for the year. Ignoring the potential step-up basis at death,102  
triggering the tax this year rather than postponing it until next year would 
cost the trust: 
α = (𝜏 ∗ (𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠) ∗ 𝑟𝑓) ∗ (1 − 𝜏) 
where τ is the tax rate and 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate. The first part of this equation 
(𝜏 ∗ ( 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠) ∗ 𝑟𝑓) represents the lost time value of money in failing to delay 
recognizing the untaxed gains, while the second part (1 − 𝜏), represents the 
fact that investors only capture the after-tax portion of these gains. This 
expression represents the excess, alpha-like return the trust can expect from 
postponing realization. Even taking the risk-free rate as high as 5%, and if 
τ = 20% is the long-term capital gains rate, then the tax benefit to not 
diversifying is 0.8% of the value of the untaxed gain and it would be 
imprudent not to diversify. The alpha benefit from not diversifying (0.8%) is 
outweighed by the cost of failing to diversify (6.3%). 
With a portfolio that is not as extremely under-diversified, the tax 
benefits might justify remaining undiversified. For example, if the trust 
instead held a portfolio of 10 stocks with 0 basis, whether it would be prudent 
to fully diversify might depend on the volatility of the market.103 During 
volatile periods, the benefits of diversification increase, but the tax benefits 
are roughly fixed. Thus, during calm periods when the diversification 
benefits are only around 0.5%, it might be prudent to not fully diversify, thus 
saving the tax costs of 0.8%. During more volatile times, however, it would 
be imprudent not to diversify. For example, the average benefit of 
diversifying during 1999–2001 or 2008–2009 was 2.2%, well in excess of 
the 0.8% tax costs.104 
Under other circumstances the gains from concentrating the trust 
portfolio may be harder to calculate, but it can still be important to estimate 
 
assets are invested, etc. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
102. Under I.R.C. § 1014(a), a person taking most kinds of property from a decedent receives 
tax basis equal to the current fair market value, regardless of the decedent’s original basis, and 
accrued capital gains at the time of death will escape income taxation. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2012). 
Many trust arrangements, however, particularly those that are irrevocable by the settlor and in which 
she retains no interest, will not entitle the trust to such a step-up basis at the settlor’s death. 
103. For purposes of this calculation, we assume the 10 stocks were selected without regard to 
how well they would diversify the portfolio. 
104. Even during the calm periods, it would likely be prudent to sell off part of the low-basis 
portfolio and diversify that portion. 
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the costs of having a concentrated portfolio. For example, trusts are often 
used to perpetuate family businesses. In these businesses, the benefits of not 
diversifying are diffuse and difficult to quantify. These benefits include the 
potential for obtaining returns higher than the market, employment at the firm 
for family members, perquisites, family sentiment and pride of ownership, 
etc. Still the trustee can estimate the cost of failing to diversify—that is, the 
offsetting alpha required to make concentrating the trust assets in the family 
firm prudent—by using the average of small publicly traded firms in the same 
sector.105 This provides a benchmark against which the benefits of control 
can be weighed. Moreover, these costs of not being diversified are likely to 
change significantly over time, with costs rising during volatile periods. 
Thus, all else equal, a prudent trustee will be more likely to seek or accede 
to a bid for the family firm in the midst of an unsettled market than in calm 
periods.106 This is true even if the mean expected return for the firm was the 
same in both periods. 
Frequently, the trustee is not only permitted to retain the concentrated 
position in a family firm but also required to do so by the settlor in the trust 
instrument. In such cases, the firm’s prospects or level of idiosyncratic risk 
may change in ways not anticipated by the settlor. Increases in risk may force 
the trustee to petition the court to allow her to sell the firm to avoid serious 
harm to the beneficiaries.107 This is known as an “equitable deviation.” Our 
results demonstrate that courts should be most amenable to these petitions 
during periods when idiosyncratic risk is high. This is consistent with the 
most famous equitable deviation case, In re Pulitzer’s Estate.108 
The Pulitzer case arose from the potential sale of the New York World 
newspaper during the throes of the Great Depression. In 1931, the trustees of 
Joseph Pulitzer’s testamentary trust petitioned the court to allow the sale of 
the New York World, which the trust was required to hold. At that time, the 
 
105. Thus, the method applied in Table 1 to all stocks could be applied just to publicly traded 
firms in the same industry. For example, when we do this for the newspaper and periodical field, 
we estimate an offsetting required alpha of 4.9% for investors with moderate risk aversion 
(CRRA = 2). 
106. If, by contrast, the offer is discounted as a result of the poor market conditions, a prudent 
trustee will not necessarily be more likely to accept it, relative to a better offer during a period with 
lower idiosyncratic risk. Likewise, individual trustees will often have information about particular 
downside risks—like the likelihood of losing an important IP suit, etc.—to the family company that 
may dominate in importance economy-wide changes in idiosyncratic risk when considering bids. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest that the risk borne by beneficiaries during periods of economic 
upheaval may increase more than trustees directly anticipate through easily viewed mechanisms 
like IP suits, etc. 
107. The trustee has a duty to petition the court if she knows or should know of changed 
circumstances that have “the potential . . . to cause substantial harm to the trust or its beneficiaries” 
and can be avoided by changing the terms of the trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1–
2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
108. 249 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. Surr. 1931). 
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paper was foundering, and the early years of the Great Depression were a 
period of enormous market upheaval and spikes in idiosyncratic risk.109 A 
moderately risk-averse person would have needed to receive a staggering 
162% expected alpha to make her willing to hold only one of the publicly 
traded newspapers during the period, instead of a diversified portfolio of U.S. 
stocks, as compared with 19% from 1926 to September 1929.110 Although 
the court did not use the language of risk, it wisely concluded that changed 
circumstances unforeseen by Pulitzer required the trustees to be allowed to 
sell the paper.111 
Our results also militate toward the possible creation of a new duty, or 
at least best practice, for the drafter of the trust to warn settlors who are 
interested in setting up a trust that would depart from the diversified, low-
fee, appropriate-risk benchmark about the offsetting alpha that would be 
required to justify that departure. Courts might even establish a cautionary 
“altering rule,” mandating that to be effective, a trust instrument opting out 
of the default duty to diversify must indicate that the settlor has been apprised 
of and understands the alpha tradeoff relevant to the investment restriction 
that the settlor wishes to put in place. 
 
5. Subsidiary Duties: Prudent Exposure to Risky Assets.—The drafters 
of the UPIA recognized that no assets are categorically imprudent for all 
beneficiaries. This allows today’s trustees to avoid being forced to make beta 
mistakes by having too little exposure to equities, unlike the old constrained 
prudent man approach. The drafters also realized, however, that creating a 
portfolio with high systemic risk is usually imprudent for trusts meant for 
highly risk-averse beneficiaries, i.e., “widows and orphans” trusts.112 
Subpart III(C), infra, quantifies this intuition, showing that, unsurprisingly, 
the trustee should expect very large alphas before it would be prudent to 
invest the portfolio of highly risk-averse beneficiaries with full market 
exposure. A risk-averse investor who but-for the alpha opportunity would 
 
109. See Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 46, at 336 fig.2 (charting extreme levels of idiosyncratic 
risk during the Great Depression); see also supra Figure 1. 
110. There were six newspaper companies traded on the NYSE or American Stock Exchange 
during the relevant period. The average (not weighted by market cap) idiosyncratic risk for these 
firms during 1931 was 6.2% per day. The alpha calculation is made using the normal distribution—
due to the fact that there are not enough firms to use a Monte Carlo simulation—for an investor with 
a CRRA coefficient of 2 and assuming the worst possible outcome is for the investor to lose 99.9% 
of her investment. 
111. See Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. at 93 (concluding that, in emergencies, a testator has impliedly 
given the trustee the power to protect the beneficiaries of a trust by selling distressed assets). 
112. See UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (noting that 
risk tolerance “varies greatly with . . . the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of the 
beneficiaries,” i.e., a trust for a widow should bear less risk than a trust for a young wealthy 
individual). 
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only rationally invest 10% of her portfolio in equities would need an 
offsetting annual alpha of 21.4% before investing in a well-diversified all-
equity portfolio with a beta of 1.113 Opportunities with so much alpha are, of 
course, rare. By contrast, relatively risk-tolerant individuals (CRRA = 1) 
would happily take very low exposure to risky assets if they could obtain 
alphas one-tenth that size. 
Our calculations can serve as benchmarks to help courts understand 
whether a trustee has taken too much risk in the portfolio. Some scholars have 
argued that by eliminating the legal list and constrained prudent man 
approach to trust investing, the UPIA eliminated the main checks on trustees’ 
incentives to take on too much risk without imposing an effective 
replacement.114 They argue that trust settlors choose trustees in part based on 
the trustees’ past investment returns but will not fully account for risk, 
leading to trustees taking excess risk to try to boost returns and thus attract 
new customers.115 Our results cannot give an exact answer to the appropriate 
level of risk, but they confirm the intuition that it is likely to be imprudent to 
invest in portfolios with β of .5 or more for highly risk-averse beneficiaries, 
even when presented with alpha opportunities as large as 360 basis points. 
By contrast, the trustee of “a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great 
wealth”116 (who is presumably relatively risk-tolerant) can reasonably choose 
to invest in less risky assets with a β that is lower than ideal, say of .5, if she 
believes there is an opportunity to gain alpha as little as 50 basis points. 
Excessive exposure to market risk becomes more costly during crisis 
periods, because even with full diversification, the systemic risk of equities 
tends to be higher during crisis periods. Hence (if the risk premium is 
assumed to have been unchanged) the cost of taking on inefficiently high 
market exposure will be particularly high during crises. For example, during 
the most recent financial crisis market risk more than doubled, leading to the 
ideal Merton share for investors falling by half, if the risk premium is 
assumed to be unchanged. This means that a trustee who was taking on only 
a bit too much systemic risk in the period before the crisis would have been 
making a much larger mistake during the crisis if she did not scale back the 
trust’s exposure to stocks. 
In addition, in both the low-tax basis and family-firm scenarios 
discussed above, a prudent trustee must consider not only the costs of the 
failure to diversify, but also the potential mismatch between the ideal 
 
113. See supra Table 3. 
114. See Sterk, supra note 82, at 882, 887 (cautioning that market forces alone are unlikely to 
constrain trustees’ risky investment behavior as well as the liability under the old constrained 
prudent man rule did). 
115. Id. at 881–82. 
116. UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt. (“Risk and return”). 
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exposure to risky assets for the beneficiaries and the exposure provided by 
the concentrated portfolio.117 
 
6. Subsidiary Duties: Duty to Incur Only Reasonable Costs.—Trust law 
recognizes that prudent investment requires the trustee to “incur only costs 
that are reasonable . . . .”118 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently found that 
“‘cost-conscious management is fundamental to prudence in the 
investment’ . . . and should be applied ‘not only in making investments but 
also in monitoring and reviewing investments.’”119 Because our empirical 
analysis of fees is limited, we contain our discussion here to observing that 
trust law includes a duty to economize on fees, preventing trustees from 
making one of the fundamental investing mistakes discussed above. 
 
7. Subsidiary Duties: “Alpha Duties,” aka Prudent Active Investing.—
The three subsidiary duties discussed above—the duty to diversify, to take 
only an appropriate amount of risk, and to incur only reasonable costs—
should be thought of together when a trustee is considering an investment 
program that would likely require significant costs.120 We believe that in such 
a situation, the three duties, collectively, should be viewed as creating what 
we call “alpha duties” for the trustee. Under these duties, a trustee must 
separately calculate the costs of the strategy in terms of excess fees, under-
diversification, and exposure and compare it to a reasonable calculation of 
the expected alpha before investing. Our empirical work shows how trustees 
could fulfill these duties at a low cost. 
Our proposed alpha duties align with the Third Restatement’s approach 
to active investment. The official comment states: 
If the extra costs and risks of an [active] investment program are 
substantial, these added costs and risks must be justified by 
 
117. For concentrated portfolios with relatively low exposure to risky assets, this can lead to 
counterintuitive results. A prudent trustee given a low beta (e.g., β = .5), low tax basis portfolio of 
50 stocks might conclude that she should sell the portfolio if the beneficiaries are highly risk averse 
or only slightly so but should hold it if the beneficiary is in the middle in terms of risk aversion. For 
the highly risk averse, the diversification benefits outweigh the tax costs, and for the relatively risk-
tolerant beneficiaries, the costs of having too little exposure to the market may exceed the tax costs. 
For moderately risk-averse beneficiaries, however, the portfolio provides close to the optimal beta, 
and the diversification benefits are smaller than for more risk-averse beneficiaries and can thus be 
less than the tax costs. 
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
119. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 843 F.3d 1187, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 90 cmt. b, 88 cmt. a). 
120. We have analyzed the three duties in separate sections to highlight the implications of our 
work for each duty, but ultimately, they must be viewed together. If a strategy provides a gross 
alpha of 2%, but has excess fees of 1.5% and also imposes under-diversification costs with an 
offsetting alpha of 1%, it is not prudent, even though the alpha is sufficient to justify either the fees 
or the departure from diversification. 
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realistically evaluated return expectations . . . . [The] gains from the 
course of action . . . [must] reasonably be expected to compensate for 
its additional costs and risks.121 
Moreover, the trustee’s duty to keep adequate records includes 
contemporaneously recording the reason for major investment decisions, like 
taking on “substantial” costs through an active investment strategy. Under 
this duty, the trustee’s reasoning and calculation of costs and expected alpha 
should thus be contemporaneously recorded.122 
Although the Restatement’s view—that the duty of prudence requires 
trustees to only invest actively if the expected alpha is reasonably expected 
to exceed the costs—makes perfect sense, its influence has been limited thus 
far. In fact, no court appears to have quoted or cited this comment since it 
was published in 1992. Perhaps this is not surprising: before our work there 
have been few attempts to systematically estimate the size of offsetting 
alphas, and these figures are needed to make the calculations that the 
Restatement seems to call for. Our analysis therefore has the potential to 
make applying the Restatement’s approach practical and thereby close a hole 
in the regulation of trust investments. 
As with other aspects of the duty to invest prudently, the trustee’s alpha 
duties would be ongoing. “[T]he trustee must systematically consider all the 
investments of the trust at regular intervals to ensure that they are [still] 
appropriate.”123 As discussed above, the duty to revisit portfolio choices is 
particularly important for strategies that are poorly diversified because our 
work shows that the costs of such a strategy will often change significantly 
over time and tend to rise during periods of market upheaval.124 
The alpha duties we propose for trustees could serve as a model for other 
areas of fiduciary law. As discussed above, trust law is highly influential on 
ERISA law, and the arguments we made above largely apply to trustees of 
defined benefit plans. These kinds of alpha duties would also make sense for 
 
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2). This section was initially published in 
1992, before much of the rest of the Third Restatement. 
122. As discussed below, many professional fiduciaries already have investment protocols that 
require this kind of alpha justification for under-diversified portfolios with single holdings making 
up more than 10 or 20% of the trust’s assets. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. An 
exception would be made for time-sensitive alpha opportunities, although care must be taken that 
this exception not be abused. 
123. Tibble, 843 F.3d at 1197 (citations omitted) (quoting AMY M. HESS, GEORGE G. BOGERT 
& GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 684, at 147–48 (3d ed. 2009)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
124. A prudent strategy will often therefore include a VIX contingent trigger that would 
presumptively trigger a rebalancing of an alpha portfolio toward a more diversified set of 
investments if market risk became too high. See Alan Moreira & Tyler Muir, Volatility-Managed 
Portfolios, 72 J. FIN. 1611, 1611 (2017) (“Managed portfolios that take less risk when volatility is 
high produce large alphas . . . .”). 
 
AYRES.LINK&SUBHEAD.FIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  11:26 PM 
498 Texas Law Review [Vol. 97:445 
 
investments by charitable trusts, as well as guardians, conservators, and 
executors. 
Trustees should also monitor over time and across clients how often 
their alpha investments actually beat the market. While alpha opportunities 
are not expected to uniformly produce returns above the market’s return, 
keeping track of return of outcomes compared to the trustee’s ex ante alpha 
assessments can provide valuable feedback that can allow trustees (as well as 
settlors, beneficiaries, and courts) to update their beliefs about the trustee’s 
ability to identify true alpha opportunities.125 
8. Some Answers to Practical Objections to Alpha Duties for Trustees 
 
a. The Duties Require the Trustee to Gather Too Much Information.—
As noted above, our analyses serve as benchmarks but cannot be directly 
applied to the question of whether a particular trust investment strategy is 
prudent without being adapted to the facts and circumstances concerning the 
beneficiary of a trust, including among other things, how other savings of the 
beneficiary are invested, her age, job, etc. A trustee, however, is already 
under a duty to gather this kind of information.126 
 
b. Reasonable Calculations Produce a Range of Offsetting Alphas, 
Rather than a Single Number.—Of course, some of the information gathered 
by the trustee may be difficult to quantify exactly, for example, the 
beneficiary’s level of risk aversion. Information of this kind is likely better 
thought of as falling into some range. Using a range of values for the 
beneficiary’s risk aversion or other parameters will likewise result in a range 
of offsetting alphas. Similarly, our results depend in part on assumptions like 
CRRA and, for some calculations, CAPM. Trustees could reasonably use 
different assumptions and arrive at different estimates, again producing a 
range of offsetting alphas. 
If the strategy at issue could have been reasonably expected to produce 
alpha exceeding the lower bound of a range that the trustee sensibly 
calculated, there should be no violation of the trustee’s alpha duties. 
 
125. The value of updating decision-maker beliefs based on interim outcomes is central to many 
areas of evidence-based policy making. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-
NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 118, 122–24 (2007) (arguing that parole boards should 
particularly pay attention to recidivism rates when overriding statistical algorithms and paroling 
prisoners they deem to be low risk). 
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (“Ordinarily this involves [the trustee] 
obtaining relevant information about such matters as the circumstances and requirements of the trust 
and its beneficiaries . . . .”). Because trustees of employee retirement plans often have thousands of 
beneficiaries, they would need to use a few representative beneficiaries to make these calculations. 
On problems created by beneficiaries with conflicting preferences, see Hines, supra note 72, at 10–
12 (illustrating such problems through an example of a trust benefiting a widow and her children). 
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Reasonable calculations, however, will still rule out many imprudent alpha-
seeking strategies falling below the lower threshold of the range. 
 
c. Imposing Alpha Duties Will Result in Too Many Suits.—As with other 
areas of the trustee’s duty to invest prudently, there is a temptation for a 
beneficiary to sue the trustee when things go badly, for example, if the market 
declines, even when the trustee has acted prudently in implementing an 
alpha-seeking portfolio. We believe that in order to combat hindsight bias, it 
is particularly important for courts to focus on the process the trustee used to 
decide on an alpha-seeking strategy. Courts already place significant 
emphasis on the trustee’s process when confronting claims that the trustee 
made one kind of potential alpha-seeking mistake: a failure to properly 
diversify. As a result, most professional trustees already have investment 
protocols in place that document the reasons for choosing to maintain any 
relatively concentrated positions (over 10% or 20%) in certain securities.127 
Courts often find the failure to set up an investment plan in a timely manner 
or adhere to an internal protocol as strongly probative of whether the trustee 
has acted imprudently.128 
In addition, to the extent our proposals create any new duties for trustees 
(or other fiduciaries discussed below), choosing a passive strategy will be a 
safe harbor from such duties.129 When fiduciaries avail themselves of this 
safe harbor it will curtail opportunistic suits. 
B. Registered Investment Advisers 
Registered investment advisers (hereinafter simply “advisers”) provide 
advice to a substantial slice of retail investors. They help manage 
approximately $9 trillion of individuals’ assets.130 Unlike a trustee, who holds 
ultimate investment authority, advisers generally make investment 
 
127. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, at 640 (noting that bank trust departments 
usually require review and special documentation of portfolios within these parameters). 
128. See In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 338–39 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that the coexecutor 
acted imprudently, in part, by failing to adhere to the internal trustee review protocol); In re Hunter, 
955 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (affirming that the executor violated the prudent 
person rule by failing to diversify in a timely manner). As one commentator noted, “Trustees who 
understand both the power of hindsight bias and the weakness of uncorroborated testimony will 
document every potentially important decision clearly, completely, and contemporaneously.” 
Randall W. Roth, Hindsight Bias and the Curse of Knowledge: Forewarned Is Forearmed, ABA 
TR. & INV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 30, 33. 
129. A passive strategy, of course, is not always prudent regardless of the circumstances. As 
under current law, it would still be imprudent for a trustee to invest 100% of trust assets in a low-
cost S&P 500 ETF when the beneficiary is highly risk averse. 
130. INV. ADVISER ASS’N, 2017 EVOLUTION REVOLUTION: A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT 
ADVISER PROFESSION 5, 16 (2017), http://www.investmentnews.com/assets/docs 
/CI111329731.PDF [https://perma.cc/9TLA-39FU] (using data reported to the SEC). 
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recommendations, which the client is empowered to reject. As a result, 
advisers are subject to somewhat less comprehensive fiduciary duties than 
trustees. Nevertheless, the alpha duties outlined above could be readily 
incorporated into advisers’ existing duties, likely even without additional 
agency or congressional action. 
 
1. Existing Law.—Advisers are regulated as fiduciaries under the 
Investment Adviser Act of 1940. The Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc.131 found that the Act imposes on advisers “an 
affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all 
material facts, as well as an affirmative obligation to employ reasonable care 
to avoid misleading his clients.”132 Therefore, like trustees, advisers must 
fulfill duties of care and loyalty to their clients.133 As part of the duty of care, 
advisers have a duty to learn their client’s needs and to recommend only 
prudent transactions in light of that, as well as to monitor the client’s 
portfolio.134 
 
2.  Incorporating Alpha Duties.—Advisers’ duty of care can easily be 
adapted to respond to the analysis of this paper. A recommendation from an 
adviser that exposes a client’s portfolio to significant diversification, beta, or 
excess-fee losses should only be deemed prudent if the fiduciary meets the 
alpha duties discussed in the previous section, calculating the costs and the 
expected alpha. The adviser should also explain this tradeoff to the client. 
And, as before, advisers should have mechanisms in place to update their 
recommendations based on evolving market conditions and to keep track of 
their success across clients with regard to predicting alpha. 
As with trustees, investment advisers (and broker–dealers, who are 
 
131. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
132. Id. at 194 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This opinion remains 
highly influential in defining the scope of advisers’ duties. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary 
Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 708 (2010) 
(remarking on the long-lasting influence of Capital Gains). 
133. See Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 440 (2010) 
(concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Capital Gains “deemed [investment advisers] 
fiduciaries vis-à-vis their clients, owing them duties of loyalty and care”). These duties are 
enforceable by private parties or the SEC through the Investment Adviser Act’s anti-fraud provision 
in § 206(2). Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012). As discussed 
below, however, private parties’ remedies are limited in a suit under the Act. 
134. See MLC Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 408759, at *1 (July 21, 1997) (providing 
that an investment adviser “must make suitable recommendations to its clients in light of their needs, 
financial circumstances[,] and investment objectives”); Suitability of Investment Advice Provided 
by Investment Advisers; Custodial Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, 59 Fed. Reg. 
13,464–67 (Mar. 22, 1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (laying out “suitability obligations 
under the Advisers Act” and “expressly prohibit[ing] investment advisers from making unsuitable 
recommendations to clients”); Laby, supra note 124, at 719 (acknowledging the duty of 
“undertak[ing] a suitability analysis”). 
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discussed below) have been criticized for beta mistakes—with courts finding 
recommendations that expose clients to risks that are excessive given the 
client’s level of risk aversion unsuitable.135 But courts have not been 
sufficiently attentive to what level of alpha could justify beta deviations. 
Accordingly, suitability inquiries informed by our analysis can lead to more 
nuanced imposition of liability that simultaneously corrects Type I and 
Type II errors under the current jurisprudence. 
Our alpha duties could be incorporated by the SEC using its regulatory 
authority to issue rules “defin[ing], and prescrib[ing] means reasonably 
designed to prevent . . . deceptive” practices.136 Moreover, even without 
additional action by the SEC, courts could absorb alpha duties into the 
doctrine by fleshing out the meaning of “full and fair disclosure” and 
“reasonable care” as used in Capital Gains in light of current best practices 
in the investment world. 
 
3. Private Remedies Would Remain Limited Absent a Legislative 
Change.—Even if our alpha duties were incorporated into the obligations of 
advisers, private remedies for violations of these duties would be somewhat 
limited. Under the Investment Advisers Act, private parties’ relief may only 
take the form of rescission or restitution, which in practice often means that 
only the adviser’s fees are recoverable after she breaches her duties.137 The 
SEC has a much broader set of remedies at its disposal, including barring the 
adviser from the industry in the most serious cases. 
Full damages are available to a private party against an adviser if 
Rule 10b-5 has been violated. Rule 10b-5 violations, however, are a subset 
of potential breaches of the duty of care. This is because a 10b-5 violation 
requires both a material misstatement (or omission of information necessary 
to make a statement not misleading) and scienter.138 An investment adviser 
 
135. See THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
§ 2:162 (2018) (stating that advisers should likely not recommend risky assets to clients near 
retirement); Charles R. Mills et al., Customer Transactions: Suitability, Unauthorized Trading, and 
Churning (“A recommended securities transaction must comport with the customer’s risk tolerance. 
The mere fact that a customer may be wealthy does not provide a basis for recommending risky 
investments, if the customer is risk averse.”), in BROKER–DEALER REGULATION § 6:1.2, at 6–7 
(Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2011); Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying 
Broker–Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 818 (2009) (listing cases where 
the court found brokers to have given unsuitable recommendations to clients). 
136. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4). 
137. See, e.g., Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 622, 643 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(explaining that the Investment Advisers Act “creates no private right of action for damages”). 
138. To recover in a Rule 10b-5 action: 
A plaintiff must prove (1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer’s 
needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities were unsuited 
to the buyer’s needs; (3) that the defendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable 
securities for the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made material 
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can make an imprudent recommendation without making a misleading 
statement or without the requisite mens rea. In such cases, 10b-5 claims will 
fail. 
These limitations on private parties’ remedies are a mixed bag from a 
policy point of view. On the one hand, these constraints tend to ameliorate 
the problems associated with parties simply suing when their investments 
decline, regardless of the ex ante quality of the fiduciary’s decision-making 
and disclosure. Moreover, unlike with trusts, primary enforcement will then 
be in the hands of an agency with substantial technical expertise and the 
ability to shape a coherent enforcement strategy. On the other hand, the SEC 
may not have the resources or incentives to pursue cases against many 
violators, leading to undercompliance. In addition, even a successful agency 
action resulting in a bad actor losing her license may be cold comfort to the 
victims of imprudent advice who have lost their investments. 
C.  Broker–Dealers 
Like advisers, broker–dealers frequently provide investment 
recommendations to retail clients. At the end of 2009, broker–dealers held 
over 100 million retail and institutional accounts.139 Broker–dealers and 
advisers therefore often play quite similar roles in providing advice to retail 
investors. Indeed, retail investors are unsure what distinguishes them.140 
Nevertheless, they are regulated somewhat differently. Broker–dealers have 
not traditionally been considered fiduciaries.141 As a result, the law today 
 
misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose material 
information) relating to the suitability of the securities; and (5) that the buyer justifiably 
relied to its detriment on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct. 
Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993). To be held liable, an 
investment fiduciary must have scienter, but some courts have interpreted each of these elements 
broadly—for example, by finding that mere “recklessness” by brokers is sufficient. See O’Connor 
v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Therefore, in our test for unsuitability 
a plaintiff must show the broker purchased the securities with an intent to defraud or with reckless 
disregard for the investor’s interests.”). But see 2 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER–
DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §§ 17.01, 19.03 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that it is unsettled whether 
recklessness suffices). 
139. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER–
DEALERS, at iii (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/U24V-BY28] [hereinafter SEC STUDY]. 
140. See id. at 98 (reporting that focus-group participants could not distinguish between broker–
dealers and investment advisers). 
141. See Langevoort, supra note 133, at 440 (noting that broker–dealers have traditionally 
offered advice in the context of selling, which “is not a fiduciary occupation”). Our Article focuses 
on the federal regulatory structure, but a minority of states do regulate brokers as fiduciaries. Mark 
Miller, U.S. States Eye Protections for Investors if Federal Regulation Falters, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-miller-fiduciary/u-s-states-eye-protections-for-
investors-if-federal-regulation-falters-idUSKBN1HJ1NT [https://perma.cc/C79Q-GR2K]. Broker–
dealers are sometimes entrusted with what is called a “discretionary account” that they can invest 
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tolerates conflicts of interest in broker–customer relationships that would not 
be acceptable for advisers under the duty of loyalty. 
A significant portion of brokers’ compensation for advice comes from 
commissions paid by mutual funds that the broker receives when she invests 
a client’s assets in the fund.142 This arrangement has the potential to bias 
brokers’ recommendations, consciously or unconsciously, toward higher 
commission funds. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that broker-sold 
mutual funds underperform the market. Moreover, the greater the 
commissions paid by the fund, the greater the degree of underperformance, 
and yet the more assets that are invested in that fund through brokerage 
accounts.143 The Council of Economic Advisers in 2015, for example, 
estimated that conflicted retirement advice leads to investments that 
underperform low-cost indices by 100 basis points per year, imposing an 
estimated $17 billion annual cost for savers in IRAs who rely on conflicted 
advice.144 Thus, millions of ordinary savers have been unsuccessfully (and 
many probably unwittingly) chasing alpha through high-fee, actively 
managed mutual funds due to conflicted advice. 
As a result, two major regulations have been proposed over the last 
couple of years that aim to curb conflicted advice from brokers. In 2016, the 
Department of Labor promulgated the “Fiduciary Rule” pursuant to ERISA, 
which would have substantially changed how brokers provided advice to 
retirement savers,145 but the Fifth Circuit vacated the rule in 2018.146 
(Although the Fiduciary Rule was promulgated under ERISA, it was aimed 
 
without the client approving each transaction. In such a case, broker–dealers act as fiduciaries, and 
what we have said regarding investment advisers generally applies. See Langevoort, supra note 133, 
at 443 (concluding that brokers have fiduciary duties when they control accounts). Broker–dealers 
may also act as fiduciaries in other circumstances but are not categorically fiduciaries like advisers. 
Id. 
142. A portion of these third-party commissions are “12b-1” fees, which alone totaled $9.5 
billion in 2009. (Note that not all 12b-1 fees, though, are paid to brokers.) Karen Damato, What 
Exactly Are 12b-1 Fees, Anyway?, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB10001424052748704009804575309011863641700rs [https://perma.cc/ZBD6-R22V]. One 
study estimated that “sales loads,” which are commissions going to brokers for selling mutual funds 
totaled another $6.4 billion in 2002. See Daniel Bergstresser, John M.R. Chalmers & Peter Tufano, 
Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4129, 
4129–30 (2009). 
143. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE 
ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 10–11, 13 tbl.4 (2015) (citing academic studies showing that funds sold 
primarily on commission tend to underperform low cost index funds, and that all else equal, funds 
with higher commissions receive more fund inflows but underperform by more than funds with 
lower commissions). 
144. Id. at 2. 
145. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20950 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 
2550). 
146. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
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primarily at changing broker–dealers’ behavior, and for that reason we 
discuss it here and not in our ERISA section below.) In April 2018, the SEC 
proposed “Regulation Best Interest,” which, if finalized, would alter the 
obligations of all broker–dealers regardless of whether their clients are saving 
for retirement or not.147 
The SEC’s approach is more flexible but arguably weaker than the DOL 
rule. It relies less on banning certain types of conflicts than the Fiduciary 
Rule. Instead, the SEC rule uses a standard. It assesses whether a 
recommendation is in the client’s “best interest” by looking at both duty of 
loyalty-like elements (“How conflicted is the broker?”) and duty of care-like 
elements (“How prudent does the recommendation seem, aside from the 
conflict?”). Thus, under the SEC rule, the prudence of a recommendation will 
often play a key role in deciding whether the advice is unacceptably biased 
toward the broker’s self-interest. 
Alpha analysis of the type we have done above can help narrow the 
range of prudent portfolio choices compared to a more basic examination. 
This in turn can prevent the SEC’s rule from permitting some types of 
conflicted advice that would otherwise meet the rule’s requirements if a more 
limited prudence analysis were done. 
1. Existing Law 
 
a. Brokers’ Suitability Obligations and the Duty of Care Are Similar.—
Broker–dealers are subject to a FINRA Rule to recommend only “suitable” 
transactions, which mimics the duty of care of trustees and advisers: 
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to 
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy 
involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on 
the information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the 
member or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment 
profile.148 
The rule requires broker–dealers to seek to obtain information about 
“the customer’s age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax 
status, investment objectives, investment experience, investment time 
horizon, liquidity needs, [and] risk tolerance . . . .”149 They must also do 
 
147. See infra subsection IV(C)(2)(b). 
148. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL § 2111 (2014). A related rule requires 
members to “know thy customer.” Id. § 2090 (“Every member shall use reasonable diligence . . . to 
know (and retain) the essential facts concerning every customer . . . .”); see Macey et al., supra note 
127, at 814 (explaining the “suitability rule” for broker–dealers). 
149. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL § 2111 (2014); see Macey et al., supra 
note 127, at 815 (positing that “broker–dealers only recommend to their clients those financial 
transactions that are suitable”); see also Mills et al., supra note 127, § 6:1.2[A], at 6-6 (emphasizing 
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reasonable diligence to understand the security that they are 
recommending.150 This all is quite similar to the duty of care of advisers and 
trustees. 
 
b. Regulation of Brokers’ Potential Conflicts of Interest Is Weaker than 
Advisers’ Duty of Loyalty.—Although not formally constrained by the duty 
of loyalty, broker–dealers are prohibited from engaging in a variety of self-
serving and unethical conduct under both case law and FINRA rules.151 Still, 
as Donald Langevoort has observed: 
An adviser is presumably expected to recommend the best available 
securities for the desired portfolio, taking costs into account. By 
contrast, a broker has no well-defined obligation to offer the best 
available securities—just suitable ones with no hidden risks or fees. 
Within these norms, the broker is free to push what is in inventory, or 
what is otherwise most profitable to sell, even if there may be other, 
less costly investments that would satisfy the customers[’] risk/return 
preferences just as well or better.152 
One might quibble with whether the broker’s freedom to push otherwise 
suitable products that generate higher fees for her is quite so unfettered. 
Suitability does have a little bit of duty of loyalty-like bite, with the SEC 
glossing the rule as requiring recommendations be “consistent with [the] 
customer’s best interests.”153 And there are cases finding against brokers for 
pushing a high-fee mutual fund, which generates higher commissions for the 
 
the importance of “[u]nderstanding a customer’s investment objective”). 
  Potentially excessive trading of portfolio investments (possible “churning”) is a species of 
excess fees that should be alpha justified. Under FINRA “quantitative suitability” regulations, 
broker–dealers are required “to have a reasonable basis for believing that a series of recommended 
transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, are not excessive and unsuitable for the 
customer when taken together in light of the customer’s investment profile, as delineated in Rule 
2111(a).” FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL § 2111.05(c) (2014). The 
regulation’s list of factors defining excessive trading activity should include alpha evidence related 
to the possibility that purchases or sales will yield excess returns. FINRA also regulates excessive 
fees by prohibiting “breakpoint sale” transactions when a regulated member sells mutual fund shares 
in dollar amounts just below the point at which the sales commission is reduced on high quantity 
transactions, so the member can obtain higher compensation. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
FINRA MANUAL § 2342 (2014). 
150. See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595–96 (2d Cir. 1969) (asserting that brokers are 
“under a duty to investigate”). 
151. See Langevoort, supra note 133, at 444 & n.20 (citing cases under the “shingle theory” 
under which brokers always make an implied representation of fair dealing). 
152. Id. at 445. 
153. Faber, Exchange Act Release No. 49216, 57 S.E.C. 297, 310 (Feb. 10, 2004); see also FIN. 
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 11-02: KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER AND 
SUITABILITY 7 n.11 (2011) (“[I]t is well-settled that a ‘broker’s recommendations must be 
consistent with his customer’s best interests’ and are ‘not suitable merely because the customer 
acquiesces in [them].’”) (citations omitted). 
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broker, over an identical fund without the fees and with lower 
commissions.154 Nevertheless, it seems fair to say the law tolerates more— 
probably significantly more—potential conflicts of interest for brokers than 
advisers. This is underscored by the important role played in brokerages of 
third-party commissions and transactions in which the broker–dealer is on 
the other side of the deal from the client. This is not true of advisers.155 
2. New Regulations Addressing Brokers’ Conflicts of Interests 
 
a. The DOL Fiduciary Rule.—The Department of Labor promulgated its 
final Fiduciary Rule in April 2016.156 The rule was eventually vacated by the 
Fifth Circuit in 2018, and the Trump administration declined to appeal this 
ruling, all but sealing its fate.157 The rule would have significantly broadened 
the definition of who becomes a fiduciary by rendering advice regarding 
retirement plan investments. The old regulation allowed most brokers 
“comfortably to conclude that they were not acting as ERISA fiduciaries 
when making most investment recommendations to retail retirement 
clients.”158 
The Fiduciary Rule, by contrast, would have pulled into its ambit most 
financial professionals, including brokers, making investment 
recommendations to retail retirement clients. If a broker became a fiduciary, 
she would be prohibited under ERISA from accepting commissions and other 
common forms of third-party compensation unless she qualified for an 
exception like the rule’s “Best Interest Contract” exemption.159 To qualify for 
that exemption, brokers would have to, among other things, accept no more 
than reasonable third-party commissions and commit to acting impartially 
and in the customer’s best interest without regard for their own financial 
 
154. See, e.g., Belden, Exchange Act Release No. 47859, 2003 WL 21088079, at *4 (May 14, 
2003) (concluding that a broker put his own interest before that of his client in recommending shares 
that would provide a “significantly greater commission[]”); FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, 
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-
faq [https://perma.cc/MDD7-AGR8] (providing examples of unsuitable broker behavior like 
recommending products based on higher commissions). Note that the words “best interest” do not 
appear in the FINRA suitability rule, and it is rather a gloss that FINRA and the SEC have put on 
the rule. 
155. See SEC STUDY, supra note 131, at 7 (explaining that “[f]ew investment advisers report[] 
receiving commission-based compensation”). 
156. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). 
157. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2018). 
158. Kenneth J. Laverierre & Matthew H. Behrens, The U.S. Department of Labor’s Final 
“Fiduciary” Rule Incorporates Concessions to Financial Service Industry but Still Poses Key 
Challenges, 17 J. INV. COMPLIANCE, no. 4, 2016, at 1, 2 (2016). 
159. Id.; Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 164–65 (N.D. Tex. 
2017). 
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interests.160 In addition, brokers becoming ERISA fiduciaries would have 
other duties of prudence and exclusive benefit, whose violation could expose 
them to liability.161 
 
b. The SEC’s Regulation Best Interest.—The SEC proposed its 
Regulation Best Interest pursuant to § 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
required the Commission to study whether the obligations of advisers and 
broker–dealers should be harmonized, and empowered it to “commence a 
rulemaking . . . to address the legal or regulatory standards of care for 
brokers, dealers, [and] investment advisers . . . .”162 The provision cautioned, 
however, that the receipt of “standard” commissions by broker–dealers 
would not by itself violate any standard the SEC decided to implement.163 
The SEC’s staff report under § 913 recommended bringing the regulations 
governing broker–dealers fully into line with the fiduciary duties applicable 
to advisers.164 
Notwithstanding the report’s recommendation, the proposed Regulation 
Best Interest does not explicitly make brokers into fiduciaries.165 The 
regulation instead seeks to walk a tightrope of permitting broker–dealers to 
retain a largely commission-based compensation model, while managing the 
conflicts of interest inherent in that scheme. The SEC expressed concern that 
too stringent an approach to conflicts would all but eliminate the 
commission-based advice model, reducing “investor choice” and freezing 
some investors out of the market for advice.166 
The actual regulation requires that brokers make recommendations that 
are in the client’s “best interest . . . at the time the recommendation is made, 
without placing the financial or other interest of the broker . . . ahead of the 
 
160. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 165. The Hugler court noted that advisers may only qualify 
for the best-interest contract exemption if they take certain steps: 
enter into a written contract with the retirement investor, agreeing to: (1) acknowledge 
their fiduciary status, (2) commit to complying with standards of impartial conduct and 
to act in the customer’s “best interest,” (3) receive no more than “reasonable 
compensation,” (4) adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to minimize the 
effect of conflicts of interest, and (5) disclose basic information about conflicts of 
interest and the cost of their advice. 
Id. 
161. Laverierre & Behrens, supra note 150, at 6. 
162. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 913(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 1827 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
163. Id. § 913(g). 
164. SEC STUDY, supra note 131. 
165. See Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-83062, 2018 WL 1911162, at 
*141 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-83062.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TG2-ZM9V] (noting that the SEC could extend a fiduciary duty to brokers, 
implying that it has not). 
166. Id. at *11–12. 
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interest of the retail customer.”167 It also includes a safe harbor if brokers 
(1) disclose material conflicts in plain English; (2) comply with the “care 
obligation”; and (3) maintain policies and procedures to disclose, manage, 
and eliminate conflicts of interest.168 The SEC rule does not ban any 
practices, though it suggests some are particularly problematic (e.g., sales 
contests), and states that for some practices, disclosure alone may not meet 
the third prong of the safe harbor. 
The “care obligation” is perhaps a bit of a misnomer because it appears 
to contain elements of both the duty of loyalty as well as the duty of care.169 
The obligation tracks the FINRA suitability rule, except with explicit 
emphasis on the customer’s best interest rather than suitability. The SEC has 
suggested that when a broker recommends products that are more expensive 
or more remunerative for her, the broker’s actions will be scrutinized more 
heavily as part of the care obligation.170 
 
3. Comparing the Two Rules and the Role of Alpha Duties.—At a high 
level, one can think of the Fiduciary Rule as substantially strengthening 
brokers’ duty of loyalty by banning most sources of conflict unless the broker 
complies with relatively onerous safeguards. The proposed SEC rule 
enhances brokers’ duty of loyalty-like obligations, but does so less than the 
Fiduciary Rule and relies more on disclosure. It will not per se ban many 
conflicts that would violate the Fiduciary Rule. Instead, it will bar those 
conflicts only on a case-by-case basis if the arrangement fails a combined test 
using factors including both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 
The advantage of the SEC’s proposal is that it is more flexible and 
preserves a wider space for investor choice. The SEC is right to worry about 
freezing savers out of the market for advice. Research shows that retail 
investors badly need financial advice due to their limited understanding of 
financial markets.171 It seems probable that brokers’ somewhat conflicted 
advice will often result in better portfolios on average than having these 
investors choose without any professional advice. How important this 
consideration is, however, depends on how many investors would have been 
frozen out under the Fiduciary Rule. It is not obvious this number would be 
 
167. Id. at *176. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at *53. 
170. Id. at *55–58; Hillel T. Cohn et al., SEC Proposes a New Standard of Care for Broker–
Dealers: Regulation Best Interest, MORRISON FOERSTER (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/180424-sec-regulation-best-interest.html 
[https://perma.cc/YZ6U-LZVR]. 
171. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch et al., The Knowledge Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing and 
the Role of Professional Advisors, 66 DUKE L.J. 633, 647 & n.81 (2016) (summarizing the criticisms 
of the Fiduciary Rule and presenting a survey that shows an important potential role for financial 
professionals in preventing investors from making a variety of investment mistakes). 
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large given that the consensus advice for retail savers is simple and should 
not be expensive to provide: invest in low-cost, well-diversified funds which 
provide age-appropriate market risk. Nevertheless, some investors may 
rationally prefer some of the commission-based advice models, which would 
not pass muster under the Fiduciary Rule. 
The danger of the SEC’s proposed course is that its regulation may be 
too weak and too indirect. The problem giving rise to both regulations is a 
duty of loyalty issue: brokers’ conflicts of interest. By not categorically 
banning many problematic conflicts using the duty of loyalty, the proposed 
rule puts more pressure on the duty of care to reveal where conflicts have 
caused a broker to recommend an imprudent choice. As noted above, this will 
often take the form of recommending chasing alpha through a high-fee, 
under-diversified, actively managed fund that pays high compensation to the 
broker. 
Our alpha analysis thus complements the SEC’s proposed rule by 
helping make the duty of care analysis more accurate. Making alpha analysis 
part of the standard “care obligation” can narrow the range of potentially 
prudent portfolios. This in turn will help the SEC identify places where 
brokers are pushing (among other things) high-fee, under-diversified, 
actively managed funds due to conflicts of interest. 
Moreover, the SEC’s proposed rule relies more on disclosure than did 
the Fiduciary Rule. Requiring clear, concise, and salient estimates of the 
alpha needed to justify investing in high-fee funds—and how infrequently 
such funds deliver that alpha—might make investors more likely to reject 
conflicted advice to buy a high-fee or under-diversified fund. These alpha 
estimates can be provided at relatively low cost, as we discuss below in 
relation to “robo-advising.” 
We do not view adding alpha analysis to the “care obligation” and 
disclosures required under the proposed SEC rule as a panacea, however. The 
fee structures of the funds recommended by brokers are not secret today, and 
all that clear disclosure can do is to tell investors that investing in most high-
fee, under-diversified funds will not pay off. When investors with relatively 
limited financial sophistication are confronted with (conflicted) advice from 
an expert to buy a fund, however, it is unclear how much even very obvious 
disclosures about high fees and alpha can do.172 Likewise, enhancing the 
“care obligations” with alpha duties can only go so far as a substitute for 
problems brought on by duty of loyalty-like conflicts. Even with alpha 
 
172. See id. at 634–35 (positing improving disclosure as a solution to problems facing investors 
but concluding that it is “unclear whether disclosure is useful to investors who do not understand 
the task at hand or the material they must evaluate”); see also Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on 
Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5–6, 20 
(2005) (arguing that, psychologically, disclosure can sometimes have perverse effects allowing the 
discloser to engage in greater opportunism while the recipient becomes more trusting). 
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analysis, the range of prudent portfolios will still often be fairly wide. If 
brokers are free under the SEC rule to recommend, within that range, the 
portfolio that pays them the most, many investors will continue to lose.173 
 
4. Changing Licensing Testing.—In addition, the licensing tests for both 
broker–dealers and advisers should be enhanced to assure that they are 
cognizant of the three tradeoffs at the heart of our analysis. FINRA currently 
requires both broker–dealers and advisers to pass exams that include sections 
covering the suitability requirement.174 But the questions on these exams fail 
to test applicants on whether failures to diversify or take appropriate levels 
of risk or to minimize investment fees can be justified by expectations of 
excess returns.175 Enhanced testing should assure that broker–dealers and 
advisers have both a theoretical and empirical understanding about the central 
alpha tradeoffs. For example, they should not only know theoretically that 
some alpha is required before sacrificing the benefits of diversification (and 
that it tends to increase during crisis periods), but they should also know 
empirically what order of magnitude this alpha must be for clients of different 
levels of risk aversion. They should be tested on what alpha is required before 
taking on too much or too little risk for their clients. And, most simply, they 
should know that any superficially excessive fees on a mutual fund must be 
alpha justified by even higher alpha expectations. Assuring ex ante that 
licensed fiduciaries have this kind of knowledge will better position them to 
follow through on the enhanced alphatized suitability requirements laid out 
above and hence make more suitable investment recommendations for their 
clients. 
 
173. Note that like the existing suitability requirements, the proposed Regulation Best Interest 
would likely not imply a private right of action. See Regulation Best Interest, supra note 157, at 
2018 WL 1911162 *13 (“Furthermore, we do not believe proposed Regulation Best Interest would 
create any new private right of action or right of rescission, nor do we intend such a result.”). Our 
comments about limited private remedies with respect to advisers, supra note 137 and 
accompanying text, thus apply here as well. 
174. Before recommending transactions involving stocks, bonds, and a variety of other 
securities, broker–dealers must, inter alia, pass a 6-hour Series 7 exam. Series 7: General Securities 
Representative Exam, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/industry/series7 
[https://perma.cc/8D5H-XFEM]. Conversely, investment adviser representatives must pass a 3-hour 
Series 65 exam. Series 65: Uniform Investment Adviser Law Exam, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY 
AUTH., http://www.finra.org/industry/series65 [https://perma.cc/J5WL-39N8]. See Michael Kitces, 
Are the Licensing and Other Requirements to Become a Financial Advisor Too Easy?, KITCES 
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.kitces.com/blog/are-the-licensing-and-other-requirements-to-
become-a-financial-advisor-too-easy/ [https://perma.cc/2PKF-5CPX] for the License 
Requirements. 
175. Test questions do presuppose a knowledge of beta. For example, one question imagines 
that a client’s $1,000,000 portfolio has an “aggressive bias towards growth stocks” and says that the 
portfolio’s “beta is 1.4” before asking how many S&P 500 index puts would be required to hedge 
the downside risk if the index is “currently at $2000.00.” SERIES 7 PRACTICE EXAM 1, 
http://www.series7practiceexam.com/series-7-practice-exam-1/ [https://perma.cc/PPC9-RYTN]. 
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D. 401(k) Fiduciaries 
Finally, we take on the implications of our analysis for 401(k) 
fiduciaries. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), sponsors of 401(k) retirement plans who manage the plan or 
exercise discretionary authority over the plan’s assets are fiduciaries and are 
required to exercise control solely in the interest of plan participants.176 But 
the “safe harbor” provision of the statute—§ 404(c)—immunizes plan 
sponsors from fiduciary liability “for any loss, or by reason of any breach, 
which results from such participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control.”177 
To qualify for this safe-harbor protection, plans must satisfy three 
prerequisites: 
First, the participant must have the right to exercise independent 
control over the assets in his or her account and must in fact exercise 
such control. Next, the participant must be able to choose from a broad 
range of investment alternatives, which requires at least three 
investment options and the plan must permit the participant to give 
instructions to the plan with respect to those options once every three 
months. Third, the participant must be given or have the opportunity 
to obtain sufficient information to make informed decisions with 
regard to investment alternatives available under the plan.178 
This third “sufficient information” requirement is particularly relevant. 
The Department of Labor should issue new regulations mandating 
periodic disclosure of individualized participant portfolio analysis as a 
prerequisite for this safe harbor immunity. While individualized analysis 
might have been costly in the past, the advent of fintech robo-advisors show 
that the marginal cost of providing such information is essentially zero. A 
host of firms including SigFig, Betterment, FutureAdvisors, and Wealthfront 
currently provide portfolio analysis for free.179 The essence of this portfolio 
review would be to assess potential losses from diversification, beta, or 
excessive-fees mistakes. The disclosures would include estimates of how 
much the portfolio would have to be expected to beat the market in order to 
justify the diversification and other failures. The disclosures should provide 
 
176. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012). These fiduciaries are required to exercise the same 
degree of care and diligence that a prudent man would demonstrate under similar circumstances. 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012); see Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 13, at 1489 
(explaining the fiduciary duties of plan sponsors under ERISA). 
177. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404(c)(2), 88 
Stat. 829, 877–78 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(ii) (2012)). 
178. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted); 
see also Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 13, at 1490–91 (elaborating on the 
“safe harbor requirements”). 
179. The providers often will also manage your portfolio for a fee. Maxime Rieman, Which 
Online Advisor Is the Best Fit for You?, NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing 
/online-advisor-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/C5JQ-LMFQ]. 
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information on specific transactions that would reduce the diversification, 
exposure, and fee losses. Some additional regulations would likely be 
necessary to ensure the quality and lack of bias of these disclosures,180 but 
the demonstrated success of SigFig and other fintech companies underscore 
the feasibility of providing such information. These “alpha-tized” warnings 
should let participants know how often portfolios with this level of alpha 
deviation ended up beating the plan’s default investment portfolio.181 This 
personalized information fits well with the existing requirements to give 
participants “the opportunity to obtain sufficient information to make 
informed decisions.”182 
Providing individualized participant portfolio analysis would also 
enhance disclosure of potential participant investment mistakes on the  
Form 5500, which plan sponsors are required to file annually with the 
Department of Labor. The second safe harbor requirement that the 
“participant must be able to choose from a broad range of investment 
alternatives” has been found to require a compliant plan to give participants 
the opportunity to diversify away most idiosyncratic risk.183 But the current 
 
180. Critics have argued that existing robo-advisors have a number of problems, including not 
offering sufficiently personalized advice and being subject to various conflicts of interest. See 
generally Melanie Fein, Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look, BANKING & INS. EJOURNAL 
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658701 [https://perma.cc/
H9VN-Y6XG] (explaining the issues associated with robo-advisors). For our scheme to work, the 
DOL would need to promulgate new regulations to ensure that the robo-advisors solicit enough 
information about the investor’s outside assets and investment horizon to make the loss calculations 
reasonably reliable and recommendations suitable, as well as free from conflicts of interest. 
181. ERISA allows plans to establish default investments, so-called QDIAs (Qualified Default 
Investment Alternatives)—which must be tailored to avoid two of the three central investment 
mistakes (lack of diversification and non-optimal exposure to equities). Ayres & Curtis, Beyond 
Diversification, supra note 13, at 1516, have argued for an Enhanced QDIA that would also mandate 
non-excessive fees. Ideally, the alpha-tized warnings would reveal how often plan participants with 
alpha deviations of various magnitudes end up beating the Enhanced QDIA—and that plans without 
a default investment announce a qualifying comparator portfolio for these disclosure purposes. 
182. Tibble, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. Another low-cost opportunity for improved personalized 
disclosure concerns “mapping”: the default reinvestment of participant savings into a sponsor-
chosen fund when a pre-existing menu option is discontinued. At the moment, plan sponsors send 
participants warnings that, absent participant objection, investments will be mapped into the new 
fund—regardless of whether participants have invested in the discontinued fund. As a result of this 
untailored disclosure, most mapping disclosures have no relevance to most participants who learn 
over time to ignore them. See Ian Ayres, The Problem of 401(k) Mapping to Dominated Funds, 
FORBES (Mar. 29, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/whynot/2014/03/29/the-problem-of-401k-
mapping-to-dominated-funds/#7d66d0e96974 [https://perma.cc/4J8W-HQTP] (stating that “many 
employees don’t pay attention to plan notices”). Instead, mapping warnings should only go to 
participants who are currently invested in the fund that is to be discontinued. The warnings should 
disclose the expense ratio of both the discontinued and default funds to which the investments will 
be mapped, and whether the mapping will increase the offsetting alpha necessary to justify 
diversification, exposure, or excess-fee losses. 
183. See Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 13, at 1490, 1501 (estimating that 
menu diversification failures are equivalent to just 5 basis points of lower return). 
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Form 5500 disclosure does not give regulators or sponsors any way to tell 
whether individual participants are taking undiversified positions.184 Fintech 
algorithms could be easily programmed to provide aggregate information 
about the extent of diversification, exposure, or excess-fee losses and how 
often these losses are in fact offset by market-beating returns.185 
The foregoing 401(k) proposals fit comfortably within the current 
§ 404(c) safe harbor regime and the definition of fiduciary under the Act and 
could be implemented by enlightened DOL regulation. However, our 
analysis also has potential implications for more far-reaching reforms to 
reduce the likelihood of investment error. To begin, plan sponsors might be 
required to assess whether their menu offerings are alpha justified. For 
example, the choice to offer corporate stock is likely to harm participants 
(whose human capital is often already overexposed to their employer’s fate) 
by needlessly increasing idiosyncratic risk if participants invest too large a 
percentage of their savings portfolio in this single equity. Offering 
undiversified menu offerings is problematic if the plan sponsor has not 
considered the offsetting alpha necessary to justify the probable failures of 
participant diversification. Similarly, plan sponsors should be asked whether 
menu offerings are alpha justified given the tendency of participants to 
naively diversify by putting some of their savings in every menu offering.186 
Sponsors should consider whether their menus include funds that are 
“dominated” by other menu options, and if so whether the fund’s presumptive 
losses might plausibly be justified by offsetting expected alpha.187 
In addition to providing participants with enhanced, individualized 
information about their portfolios, ERISA might go further and require 
participants to pass a “Retirement Plan Investment Sophistication” test before 
investing in portfolios that need an offsetting alpha of over 1% annually. This 
testing requirement is an example of an altering rule that “reduces the 
likelihood of error by requiring individuals to demonstrate actual knowledge 
of the issues related to opt out before they can deviate from the status quo.”188 
 
184. The form requires disclosure of aggregate plan investments, which might substantially 
mask diversification problems (for example, if some participants are solely invested in bonds while 
others are solely invested in equities). 
185. It might also be advisable to analogously require that broker–dealers report the extent to 
which their clients’ portfolios are not fully diversified. 
186. See generally Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in 
Defined Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (2001) (analyzing why participants 
divide their contributions evenly among the options offered). 
187. As defined by Ayres and Curtis, a menu offering is dominated if no rational investor would 
invest funds in this option given the other option available on the menu. Ayres & Curtis, Beyond 
Diversification, supra note 13, at 1504–05. A high-cost S&P index option would be an example of 
a dominated fund if a lower-cost S&P index were also available. Ayres and Curtis found that nearly 
half of 401(k) plans that they analyzed included dominated funds in their menus and that these 
dominated funds garnered 11.5% of plan assets. Id. at 1506. 
188. Ayres & Curtis, supra note 24, at 1525. 
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Train and test altering has been deployed in other high-stakes settings (such 
as student loans and human-subjects approval189) and has been recommended 
for testing securities sophistication.190 Participants who demonstrate by 
passing the test that they are aware of the kinds of tradeoffs at the core of our 
analysis would be free to seek alpha in ways that exposed them to some 
mixture of diversification, exposure, or excess-fee losses. But the vast 
majority of shareholders would be restricted from pursuing nonstandard 
investment strategies.191  
Returning briefly here to the issue of brokers giving retirement savers 
conflicted advice, requiring such retirement investors to pass a test 
concerning alpha tradeoffs before putting their savings in high-fee, under-
diversified funds would be more effective in combatting conflicted 
investment advice than simple disclosure. A policy based on testing—while 
defensible both as consumer protection and conserving the taxpayer subsidy 
implicit in IRAs—might well be politically infeasible, however. As with the 
Fiduciary Rule and (to a lesser extent) Regulation Best-Interest, it would 
engender strong opposition from parties who benefit from the current system. 
Moreover, it might prove far more unpopular with the public than either of 
those regulations because it would deem a significant portion of the 
population not informed enough to pass the test. 
Our finding that the size of offsetting alpha can vary substantially over 
time also suggests that plans might institute an automatic remapping of 
participant portfolios. A portfolio that, for example, starts bearing more 
costly idiosyncratic risk during a period of market upheaval might by default 
be mapped into a portfolio that requires less of an offsetting alpha unless the 
participant owner either passes the sophistication test (and thereby gains the 
right to make alpha-opportunity bets) or, before the mapping, the participant 
self-directs the investments to a portfolio with sufficiently lower 
diversification, exposure, and excess-fee losses. 
 
189. The 2008 Higher Education Opportunity Act encourages institutions administering student 
loan programs to use “interactive programs that test the borrower’s understanding of the terms and 
conditions of the borrower’s loans . . . using simple and understandable language and clear 
formatting.” 20 U.S.C. § 1092(l)(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations require researchers to train and test on the requisite privacy 
protection before they can access personal health information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b) (2017). 
190. A 2009 Forbes article suggested that sophisticated investors “should be required to meet 
minimum qualifications, attend a few educational classes[,] and pass a basic test of knowledge of 
the markets.” John E. Girouard, The Sophisticated Investor Farce, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/accredited-investor-sec-personal-finance-financial-advisor-
network-net-worth.html [https://perma.cc/QG86-AHXU]. 
191. The possibility of a sophistication test is also explored by Ayres and Curtis in Beyond 
Diversification, supra note 13, at 1525, albeit without testing participants’ knowledge of alpha 
tradeoffs. 
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Conclusion 
Instead of prohibiting investment fiduciaries from recommending or 
allowing clients to “seek alpha,” we have proposed making sure that the 
fiduciaries understand how much alpha is required to offset specific kinds of 
losses. Failures to minimize fees, to fully diversify, or to get the right amount 
of market exposure can be justified by sufficient expectations that a portfolio 
will generate above-market returns. This Article has estimated how much 
alpha is necessary to offset these particular kinds of portfolio losses which 
arise from departing from the low-fee, well-diversified, appropriate market 
exposure baseline.  Requiring that fiduciaries understand and explicitly 
weigh these alpha tradeoffs might reduce both Type I and Type II errors. 
Some fiduciaries will refrain from pursuing alpha investment opportunities 
when they learn that the benefit of the expected alpha is outweighed by the 
expected losses.192 Other fiduciaries who are now deterred from alpha 
opportunities may discover that the expected benefits of some of these 
investments outweigh their costs. 
It is not necessarily stupid to put all of your retirement eggs in one 
basket. But most people who do so are making a grave mistake. This Article 
integrates both of these maxims by acknowledging that alpha opportunities 
can render nonstandard investment strategies rational and showing that the 
required offsetting alpha to justify diversification, exposure, and excess-fee 
losses are often surprisingly large. 
 
192. Reducing Type II errors might exacerbate the problem of “common ownership” if firms 
that compete in product or service markets become increasingly owned by very diversified 
shareholders. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1303–04 
(2016) (arguing that the common ownership of companies whose outputs are in the same product 
market can lead to anticompetitive effects); see generally David Gilo et al., Partial Cross Ownership 
and Tacit Collusion, 37 RAND J. ECON. 81 (2006); Erik P. Gilje et al., The Rise of Common 
Ownership 2 (June 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). However, the potential 
anticompetitive effect of inducing increased diversification can be remedied by other government 
interventions. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of 
Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2017) (arguing that passive funds should be allowed 
to hold a large stake in only one firm in a given oligopolistic industry, which would lead to only 
relatively small diversification losses and significantly lessen anticompetitive effects). See generally 
Ian Ayres & Stephen F. Ross, “Pro-competitive Executive Compensation” as a Condition for 
Approval of Mergers that Simultaneously Exploit Consumers and Enhance Efficiency, CANADIAN 
COMPETITION REC., Spring 1998 (proposing that mergers be conditioned on “pro-competitive 
compensation packages”). 
